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I. INTRODUCTION 
The experiment with unpublication of federal appellate cases has failed.  
The constitutionality of declaring certain cases to be outside the body of 
precedent has never been addressed by a rulemaking body or determined by 
the United States Supreme Court, but cases seeking such a constitutional 
ruling should be brought.  The history of our judicial system and the 
unfairness of the unpublication system suggest that the process of stripping 
precedential status from some decisions is not constitutional.  Moreover, 
several Supreme Court Justices have expressed concern about the 
unpublication system or support for the historical perspective that precedent is 
integral to judicial power under the Constitution.  Together, these things make 
the issue ripe for review. 
The practice of issuing some federal appellate court opinions as 
unpublished, uncitable, and unprecedential was instituted in the mid-1970s 
following an influential report by the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice‘s 
Committee on Use of Appellate Court Energies (the 1973 Committee).
1
  The 
practice of issuing opinions in this manner, referred to throughout this Article 
as the ―unpublication system,‖ was launched without addressing the 
jurisprudential implications of declaring some common law decisions to be 
nonprecedent.
2
  The authors of the unpublication system viewed the task of 
justifying the denial of precedential status to some opinions as ―a morass of 
 
1. The Advisory Council on Appellate Justice, Committee on Use of Appellate Court Energies, 
(the 1973 Committee) drafted a report, Standards for Publication of Judicial Opinions: A Report of 
the Committee on Use of Appellate Energies of the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice, which 
forms the basis for the present federal unpublication system.  In that report, the 1973 Committee 
proposed issuing some decisions as unpublished and uncitable.  When faced with the question of 
whether this new class of decisions would be precedent, it chose not to examine the issue, its 
constitutionality, or its practicality, calling it a ―morass of jurisprudence.‖  This unexamined, 
unjustified change to the common law system must be addressed.  See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON 
APPELLATE JUSTICE, COMM. ON USE OF APP. CT. ENERGIES, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF 
JUDICIAL OPINIONS: A REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON USE OF APPELLATE ENERGIES OF THE 
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE (1973) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION]. 
2. Id. at 20. 
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jurisprudence‖ and avoided it entirely.3  Now that these formerly unworthy 
opinions are both widely published
4
 and freely citable,
5
 only the third 
alteration to the status of these opinions remains: they are not precedent.  This 
is the most problematic and least justified of the three changes suggested by 
the 1973 Committee. 
As a way to reduce the federal judicial workload and reduce case 
archiving and researching costs, the 1973 Committee decided that some cases 
that did not make new law could be issued as unpublished.
6
  To ensure that 
there was no market for such opinions, it was decided to prevent citation to 
them.
7
  Finally, the Committee considered what precedential status this new 
class of unpublished, uncitable opinions would have.
8
  It understood that it 
would be best for the system if these decisions were unprecedential, but it also 
understood that proclaiming them to be so was problematic.
9
  The Committee 
shrewdly refrained from denying that unpublished opinions were precedent.  
Instead, it took a position that ―relies on the correspondence of publication 
and precedential value on the one hand, and of non-publication and non-
precedential value on the other.‖10  That is, if the practicing bar and public 
cannot see the opinions, then they cannot use them as precedent—a sort of 
judicial out of sight, out of mind.  Unfortunately, the number of federal 
appellate decisions rendered as ―unpublished‖ has risen to over 84%.11  The 
―correspondence‖ anticipated by the Committee has failed, despite rising rates 
of unpublished decisions.  Lawyers and judges do value such cases, to the 
extent that they are now fully published and freely citable. 
This correspondence upon which the Committee relied has unraveled 
almost entirely.  It has been undermined by changes in technology, persistent 
practice by the federal bar and federal judiciary, and the new Federal Rule of 
 
3. Id. 
4. Scott E. Gant, Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and New Federal Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 47 B.C. L. REV. 705, 709–10 (2006); Kirt Shuldberg, Digital Influence: 
Technology and Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 CAL. L. REV. 541, 551 
(1997).  See generally E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. 2899, 
2913 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006)); WEST‘S FEDERAL APPENDIX. 
5. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1. 
6. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 1, at 5, 12. 
7. Id. at 18–20.  The fact that such a limitation was necessary signals that these cases do make 
new law by expanding, contracting, or simply applying existing standards, which belies the error in 
the entire premise of the scheme. 
8. Id. at 18. 
9. Id. at 18–19. 
10. Id. at 21. 
11. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 52 
tbl.S-3 (2006) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/ 
tables/s3.pdf (showing the percentage unpublished in the twelve-month period ending September 30, 
2006, to be 84.1%). 
688 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [92:685 
Appellate Procedure 32.1.  Though still labeled ―unpublished opinions,‖ these 
opinions are published, not only online but also in printed volumes such as the 
West‘s Federal Appendix.  This is in large part due to the continuous use of 
these opinions by practitioners and judges—despite the opinions‘ citation or 
precedential status.
12
  Finally, the new Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
allows citations of all opinions (albeit prospectively).
13
  These opinions are 
now effectively published and plainly citable.  The only remaining feature of 
the 1970s unpublication system is the fundamental jurisprudential impact of 
removing cases from the body of precedent—the most important feature of 
the system, but also the one with unexamined justifications.  This should be 
examined and the precedential status of these opinions acknowledged. 
The Supreme Court has referred to the issue of unpublished opinions only 
in passing, and it has never taken on the question directly, either on a petition 
for certiorari or as part of its rulemaking authority.  It has been presented the 
issue directly as part of petitions for certiorari more than thirty times
14
 but has 
 
12. David R. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning Precedential 
Status to All Opinions, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 61, 166–73 (forthcoming 2009). 
13. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1. 
14. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Untracht v. Fikri, 128 S. Ct. 1666 (2008) (No. 07-932), 2008 
WL 154432 [hereinafter Untracht Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Spiegel v. Volvo Cars N. 
Am., L.L.C., 128 S. Ct. 911 (2008) (No. 07-573), 2007 WL 3225519 [hereinafter Spiegel Petition]; 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 128 S. Ct. 669 (2007) (No. 07-453), 2007 
WL 2890417 [hereinafter Canatella Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Family Fare, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 127 S. Ct. 2991 (2007) (No. 06-1536), 2007 WL 1481871 [hereinafter Family Fare Petition]; 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Wheeler v. Mo. Dir. of Revenue, 549 U.S. 1266 (2007) (No. 06-1054), 
2007 WL 275948 [hereinafter Wheeler Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Stilley v. 
Marschewski, 549 U.S. 1112 (2007) (No. 06-520), 2006 WL 2966557 [hereinafter Stilley Petition]; 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Shefchuk v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 549 U.S. 952 (2006) (No. 05-1384), 
2006 WL 1151375 [hereinafter Shefchuk Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, N. Pacifica L.L.C. 
v. City of Pacifica, 546 U.S. 1138 (2006) (No. 05-604), 2005 WL 3067191 [hereinafter N. Pacifica 
Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Heavrin v. Schilling, 546 U.S. 1137 (2006) (No. 05-508), 
2005 WL 2708404 [hereinafter Heavrin Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, O.S.C. Co. v. 
Zymblosky, 546 U.S. 936 (2005) (No. 05-156), 2005 WL 1811046 [hereinafter O.S.C. Petition I]; 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, O.S.C. Co., 546 U.S. 936 (No. 05-156), 2005 WL 1811047 
[hereinafter O.S.C. Petition II]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rana v. United States, 546 U.S. 877 
(2005) (No. 05-255), 2005 WL 2055899 [hereinafter Rana Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
Seils v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 544 U.S. 920 (2005) (No. 04-807), 2004 WL 2912787 [hereinafter 
Seils Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 543 U.S. 819 (2004) 
(No. 03-1678), 2004 WL 1400165 [hereinafter Zimmerman Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
Schmier v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 543 U.S. 818 (2004) (No. 03-1660), 2004 WL 1369162 [hereinafter 
Schmier III Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rodriguez v. HFP, Inc., 541 U.S. 903 (2004) 
(No. 03-971), 2004 WL 50121 [hereinafter Rodriguez Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Carey 
v. Knox County, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004) (No. 03-770), 2003 WL 22867741 [hereinafter Carey 
Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Reply Brief, Test v. Comm‘r, 538 U.S. 961 (2003) (No. 02-
1170), 2003 WL 21698680 [hereinafter Test Reply Brief]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Martin v. 
KeyCorp, 538 U.S. 961 (2003) (No. 02-1150), 2003 WL 21698636 [hereinafter Martin Petition]; 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Berrafato v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 537 U.S. 
1233 (2003) (No. 02-1015), 2002 WL 32133835 [hereinafter Berrafato Petition]; Petition for Writ of 
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denied all but one request.
15
  Even in that one case, the Court ultimately 
decided the case without reference to the unpublication system.
16
  Individual 
Justices have commented in professional writings, interviews, speeches, 
concurring and dissenting opinions, and similar venues about the 
unpublication system in ways that may provide clues to the Court‘s 
willingness to rule on the issue.  The citadel of unpublication is falling,
17
 and 
while it is by no means clear, there is at least some evidence to suggest that 
the Supreme Court may help with, or at least approve of, the demolition. 
 
Certiorari, S. Clay Prods., Inc. v. United Catalysts, Inc., 537 U.S. 1189 (2003) (No. 02-848), 2002 
WL 32133762 [hereinafter S. Clay Prods. Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lewin v. Cooke, 
537 U.S. 881 (2002) (No. 02-49), 2002 WL 32134165 [hereinafter Lewin Petition]; Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari, Lemelson Med. v. Symbol Techs., 537 U.S. 825 (2002) (No. 01-1855), 2002 WL 
32135953 [hereinafter Lemelson Med. Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Alcan Aluminum 
Corp. v. Prudential Assurance Co., 536 U.S. 959 (2002) (No. 01-1594), 2002 WL 32135303 
[hereinafter Alcan Aluminum Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Wendt v. Mineta, 536 U.S. 
941 (2002) (No. 01-1613), 2002 WL 32135384 [hereinafter Wendt Petition]; Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Mims v. United States, 534 U.S. 1132 (2002) (No. 01-862), 2001 WL 34117254 
[hereinafter Mims Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Pappas v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 534 U.S. 
1129 (2002) (No. 01-772), 2001 WL 34117413 [hereinafter Pappas Petition]; Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Segal v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 534 U.S. 1041 (2001) (No. 01-494), 2001 WL 
34115636 [hereinafter Segal Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bostron v. Massanari, 534 U.S. 
896 (2001) (No. 01-290), 2001 WL 34116247 [hereinafter Bostron Petition]; Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Knight v. Maleng, 534 U.S. 820 (2001) (No. 00-1808), 2001 WL 34125170 [hereinafter 
Knight Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Smyly v. IBM, 528 U.S. 982 (1999) (No. 99-367), 
1999 WL 33639987 [hereinafter Smyly Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Schmier v. 
Jennings, 522 U.S. 1149 (1998) (No. 97-1206), 1998 WL 34112160 [hereinafter Schmier II Petition]; 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Culp v. Hood, 519 U.S. 1042 (1996) (No. 96-696), 1996 WL 
33421950 [hereinafter Culp Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Litton Sys., Inc. v. Carroll, 516 
U.S. 816 (1995) (No. 94-1989), 1995 WL 17050077 [hereinafter Litton Sys. Petition]; Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, Friedman v. Montgomery County, 489 U.S. 1079 (1989) (No. 88-1190), 1988 WL 
1093420 [hereinafter Friedman Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Van Sant v. U.S. Postal 
Serv., 475 U.S. 1082, reh’g denied, 476 U.S. 1131 (1986) (No. 85-1096), 1985 WL 695444 
[hereinafter Van Sant Petition]; Do-Right Auto Sales v. U.S. Ct. of App. for 7th Cir., 429 U.S. 917 
(1976). 
15. Untracht, 128 S. Ct. 1666; Spiegel, 128 S. Ct. 911; Canatella, 128 S. Ct. 669; Family Fare, 
127 S. Ct. 2991; Wheeler, 549 U.S. 1266; Stilley, 549 U.S. 1112; Shefchuk, 549 U.S. 952; N. Pacifica 
L.L.C., 546 U.S. 1138; Heavrin, 546 U.S. 1137; O.S.C. Co., 546 U.S. 936; Rana, 546 U.S. 877; Seils, 
544 U.S. 920; Zimmerman, 543 U.S. 819; Schmier, 543 U.S. 818; Rodriguez, 541 U.S. 903; Carey, 
540 U.S. 1218; Test, 538 U.S. 961; Martin, 538 U.S. 961; Berrafato, 537 U.S. 1233; S. Clay Prods., 
Inc., 537 U.S. 1189; Lewin, 537 U.S. 881; Lemelson Med., 537 U.S. 825; Alcan Aluminum Corp., 
536 U.S. 959; Wendt, 536 U.S. 941; Mims, 534 U.S. 1132; Pappas, 534 U.S. 1129; Segal, 534 U.S. 
1041; Bostron, 534 U.S. 896; Knight, 534 U.S. 820; Smyly, 528 U.S. 982; Schmier, 522 U.S. 1149; 
Culp, 519 U.S. 1042; Litton Sys., Inc., 516 U.S. 816; Friedman, 489 U.S. 1079; Van Sant, 475 U.S. 
1082; Do-Right Auto Sales, 429 U.S. 917. 
16. Browder v. Dir., Dep‘t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 258 n.1 (1978). 
17. See Stephen R. Barnett, No-Citation Rules Under Siege: A Battlefield Report and Analysis, 
5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 473, 473 (2003) (referencing Judge Cardozo‘s famous phrase in 
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931), that ―[t]he assault upon the citadel of 
privity [was] proceeding . . . apace‖ to make a similar claim regarding no-citation rules). 
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This Article will address this issue in four parts.  First, it will examine, 
briefly, the history of publication and precedent.  Second, it will set forth the 
constitutional infirmities in denying the precedential value of some decisions.  
Third, it will discuss the Supreme Court‘s treatment of challenges to the 
unpublication system.  Finally, it will examine the statements of current 
Supreme Court Justices in separate opinions, scholarship, and media 
comments on the issue of unpublication system and precedent.
18
 
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF PUBLICATION AND PRECEDENT 
Throughout English and American history, the publication status of an 
opinion was not directly determinative of its precedential value.  That is, 
while it may have been difficult for litigants to find a court‘s past decisions, 
nothing prevented a litigant from bringing such a decision to the court‘s 
attention or suggesting that the court need not follow it.
19
  The 1973 
Committee set in motion an odd distinction that had not been present in 
common law in England or America.  On its face, the Committee‘s 
recommendation claims to deal with only whether an unpublished case can be 
 
18. This Article focuses on the potential for Supreme Court review rather than on its potential 
rulemaking.  The Supreme Court has the authority to change the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure (FRAP) to clarify the precedential status of all opinions.  Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2071–2077 (2006).  It is unclear whether an addition to FRAP 32.1 recognizing the precedential 
value of all opinions would take as long to approve as FRAP 32.1 did, or whether, given the 
unraveling of the unpublication system, such a change would be more quickly adopted.  What is clear 
is that a change to the rule would be easy to draft technically by adding a part (c): ―(c) The 
precedential value of any opinion, order, judgment, or written disposition shall not be affected by its 
designation as ‗unpublished,‘ ‗not for publication,‘ ‗non-precedential,‘ ‗not precedent,‘ or the like.‖  
This language tracks that already in FRAP 32.1 for similar concepts.  Some believe that the Advisory 
Committee on Appellate Rules ought to have included a more meaningful statement about precedent 
in FRAP 32.1, while others question whether the Rules Enabling Act would allow such a substantive 
issue to be addressed by rule.  Compare Ununpublished, 7 GREEN BAG 105, 107 (2004) 
(―Reasonable minds differ about whether the constitution does, or sound public policy should, permit 
courts to limit the use and legal force of unpublished opinions.  It‘s too bad the Advisory Committee 
has done next to nothing to address those differences.  Most judges give better reasons for their 
decisions—at least in their published opinions.‖) with Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: 
Explaining the Sturm Und Drang Over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1429, 1484 n.273 (2005) (―A rule that prescribed the legal force that must be accorded 
unpublished opinions would likely ‗abridge, enlarge or modify‘ the ‗substantive right[s]‘ of the 
parties and thus proposing such a rule is likely beyond the authority provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) 
(2000).‖).  The decision of the Advisory Committee to avoid the issue of precedent is an 
understandable, if regrettable, one.  But the idea that the circuits may deny the precedential status of 
some opinions by rule but the Supreme Court may not acknowledge the precedential status of all 
opinions makes little sense.  If recognizing that all decisions have precedential value enlarges 
substantive rights, then surely denying precedential value to some decisions reduces those rights. 
19. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 204 (3d ed. 1990) (Even 
in the earliest days of reporting cases, ―[t]he rolls continued to be the most authoritative source of 
precedents into later times, and it was common for counsel to ‗vouch the record‘ when citing a 
previous case.‖). 
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cited as precedent and not whether it is precedent.
20
  This is a distinction 
without a difference.  The 1973 Committee plainly understood that removing 
a decision from publication and citation very effectively removed it from the 
body of precedent as well as from view.  In fact, it relied on this 
―correspondence of publication and precedential value on the one hand, and of 
non-publication and non-precedential value on the other,‖21 to avoid 
examining the precedent issue in greater detail.  A brief examination of the 
history of common law demonstrates the centrality of precedent to that 
system.
22
  While there may be normative arguments about the desirability of a 
common law system, it is readily apparent that we have historically had one.  
As a cornerstone of the common law system, this central notion of precedent 
has survived the unpublication system, unraveled that system, and now waits 
to be reacknowledged. 
A. Early England 
The origins of modern common law and modern notions of legal 
precedent are typically traced to England under the reign of Henry II in the 
latter half of the twelfth century.
23
  Henry II united England under a common 
system of laws and, as a contemporary legal treatise indicates, a coherent 
system of law involving both a central court and itinerant (circuit) court 
judges.
24
  The result of this more fixed system was a professional bar and 
system of law so important that the arguments of members of the bar and the 
court itself were being recorded in books.
25
  Once recorded, these arguments 
and the decisions of the court served as tools for the learning of the law, 
navigation of the court system by practitioners, and an aid to consistency in 
decision-making by courts. 
After the first century under this budding system, famed jurist Henry de 
Bracton explained the principles and procedures of English law through a 
collection of cases (the Note Book) and an accompanying treatise (Treatise on 
the Laws of England) commonly referred to simply as Bracton.
26
  Bracton‘s 
treatise indicated existing reliance upon prior cases and aided future 
 
20. See STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
21. Id. at 21. 
22. A more lengthy recitation can be found in Cleveland, supra note 12, at 69–84. 
23. BAKER, supra note 19, at 15. 
24. Id. at 22. 
25. Id. at 23. 
26. HENRY DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE (ON THE LAWS AND 
CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND) (George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne trans., Harvard Univ. Press 
1968) (1569); see also BAKER, supra note 19, at 201–02; JAMES W. TUBBS, THE COMMON LAW 
MIND: MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS 7–20 (2000). 
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development of the concept of precedent.
27
  By the latter half of the thirteenth 
century, records of the arguments and decisions, in ―the very words of judges 
and pleaders,‖ were being kept.28  Yearbooks from the period reveal that both 
counsel and the court cited to prior decisions and openly acknowledged that 
their decisions would be viewed as precedent in later cases.
29
  Early precedent 
was not limited to published accounts.  By the sixteenth century, England had 
a number of case reports, including Plowden‘s Commentaries and Bulstrode‘s 
careful reporting of the decisions of the King‘s Bench,30 but the most 
influential of these was Sir Edward Coke‘s thirteen-volume treatise of past 
cases, typically referred to as The Reports.
31
  Sir Coke‘s volumes were well-
known, likely due to his comprehensiveness, style, and personal 
accomplishments.
32
  Coke cited to both ancient and recent precedent and 
perceived precedent to be the center of the judicial exercise.
33
  Coke viewed 
refinement of the law through repeated application as an important element of 
the common law.
34
 
By the latter half of the eighteenth century there was a greater adherence 
to the dictates of precedent; a major proponent of this trend was Sir William 
Blackstone.
35
  Blackstone perceived the adherence to precedent as the 
generally applicable rule and judicial discretion to ignore precedent as the 
exception—an exception that was limited to instances where the precedent 
was ―manifestly absurd or unjust‖ or ―contrary to reason.‖36  The effect of 
precedent as Blackstone perceived it became central to English jurisprudence: 
 
27. BRYCE LYON, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 435–36 
(2d ed. 1980). 
28. BAKER, supra note 19, at 225. 
29. Id.  For example, one case reveals a judge, perhaps speaking directly to a case reporter, 
saying regarding his decision that ―one may safely put that in his book for law.‖  Id. (citing Midhope 
v. Prior of Kirkham, 36 S.S. 178 (1313)). 
30. Id. at 210. 
31. Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43, 62 
(2001); Anika C. Stucky, Comment, Building Law, Not Libraries: The Value of Unpublished 
Opinions and Their Effects on Precedent, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 403, 412–13 (2006). 
32. Stucky, supra note 31, at 413. 
33. Id. 
34. Healy, supra note 31, at 66 (citing JOHN GREVILLE AGARD POCOCK, THE ANCIENT 
CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 35 (1987)); H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern 
Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1536–37 & n.91 (1987) (book 
review).  Coke‘s idealistic vision of improving the law itself through accumulation of applications of 
the law should be realized in modern common law systems.  We possess the ability to record both 
arguments and decisions with greater certainty, to retain those records more permanently, and to 
disseminate the decisions to a wider audience.  More applications of the principles of law to facts, 
such that those principles are tested and refined, improve our understanding of those principles and 
give greater certainty to those seeking to conform their conduct to them. 
35. Healey, supra note 31, at 70. 
36. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69–70. 
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By the beginning of the nineteenth century, courts began to 
regard a line of decisions as absolutely binding, though they 
could still depart from a single decision, or even two 
decisions, for sufficient reasons. Gradually that exception 
also disappeared and by the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, courts asserted an obligation to follow all prior cases, 
no matter how incorrect. Even the House of Lords, which had 
never regarded its own precedents as binding, declared in 
1861 that it was absolutely bound by its past decisions.
37
 
 
Blackstone‘s ideas of precedent and common law are well-documented in 
his Commentaries on the Laws of England and were extremely influential in 
both England and America in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.
38
  Indeed, Blackstone‘s Commentaries were influential in the early 
development of the United States legal system, which imported the common 
law system, with its notions of precedent.
39
 
B. Early United States 
―American courts have always adhered to a common law system that is 
dependent upon precedent.‖40  America‘s41 courts were varied during the 
founding and have changed since then, but their implicit reliance on inherited 
ideas about the law is difficult to deny.  As Justice Story explained: 
 
The case is not alone considered as decided and settled; but 
the principles of the decision are held, as precedents and 
 
37. Healy, supra note 31, at 72. 
38. William S. Brewbaker III, Found Law, Made Law and Creation: Reconsidering 
Blackstone’s Declaratory Theory, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 255, 255 (2007) (―Sir William Blackstone‘s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England is arguably the single most influential work of jurisprudence 
in American history.‖); Herbert J. Storing, William Blackstone, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 622–34 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987); see also Albert W. 
Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996); Harold J. Berman & Charles J. 
Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 
437, 489–96 (1996); Rupert Cross, Blackstone v. Bentham, 92 L.Q. REV. 516, 516 (1976); S.F.C. 
Milsom, The Nature of Blackstone’s Achievement, 1 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1981); Wilfrid 
Prest, Blackstone as Architect: Constructing the Commentaries, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 103, 108 
(2003). 
39. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 78–80. 
40. Suzanne O. Snowden, “That’s My Holding and I’m Not Sticking To It!” Court Rules That 
Deprive Unpublished Opinions of Precedential Authority Distort the Common Law, 79 WASH. U.  
L.Q. 1253, 1256 (2001). 
41. The use of ―America‖ throughout this Article refers, of course, to the United States of 
America, not to the Americas at large.  Hopefully, the meaning is clear, and the connotation is that 
the author is succinct, not that he is provincial. 
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authority, to bind future cases of the same nature.  This is the 
constant practice under our whole system of jurisprudence.  
Our ancestors brought it with them, when they first emigrated 
to this country; and it is, and always has been considered, as 
the great security of our rights, our liberties, and our property.  
It is on this account, that our law is justly deemed certain, and 
founded in permanent principles, and not dependent upon the 
caprice, or will of particular judges.
42
 
 
Blackstone‘s Commentaries and his ideas about precedent were as 
resonant with American lawyers as they were with English lawyers: ―[t]he 
Commentaries became the chief if not the only law books in every lawyer‘s 
office, and the most important if not the only textbook for law students.‖43  
Many scholars have noted the profound effect of Blackstone‘s common law 
scholarship on the thinking of both the revolutionary and founding 
generations of America.
44
  Blackstone‘s Commentaries have been described 
as the principal source of legal education of Alexander Hamilton
45
 and an 
awe-inducing inspiration to the young James Kent.
46
 
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Blackstone‘s 
philosophy was married with increased reporting of case decisions.
47
  Much as 
it had in England, the law had become less dependent upon natural or divine 
law and more a law of artificial reason.
48
  It also became more the function of 
a professional, well-trained legal profession with an interest in increasing the 
power of the court system.
49
  Once the states had adopted
50
 the parts of 
 
42. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 377 
(1833) (quoted in Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 903–04 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as 
moot on other grounds en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000)). 
43. DAVID A. LOCKMILLER, SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 170 (1938). 
44. William D. Bader, Some Thoughts on Blackstone, Precedent, and Originalism, 19 VT. L. 
REV. 5, 6 (1994). 
45. JACOB ERNEST COOKE, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 29 (1982). 
46. Bader, supra note 44, at 11 (quoting WILLIAM KENT, MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES 
KENT LL.D. 18 (1898)). 
47. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 89 (3d ed. 2005). 
48. Compare Mark L. Jones, Fundamental Dimensions of Law and Legal Education: An 
Historical Framework—A History of U.S. Legal Education Phase I: From the Founding of the 
Republic Until the 1860s, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1041, 1099–1102 (2006) (recounting at length 
the circumstances of Lord Coke‘s explanation of artificial reason in the law) and Bernadette Meyler, 
Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 585 (2006) (discussing Coke‘s 
description of artificial reason) with Carl F. Stychin, The Commentaries of Chancellor James Kent 
and the Development of an American Common Law, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 440, 451–52 (1993) 
(discussing Chancellor Kent‘s similar view of American law as founded upon such ―cultivated and 
artificial reason[ing]‖). 
49. Bader, supra note 44, at 6–7; Stychin, supra note 48, at 451–52. 
50. The technical term is ―received.‖ 
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English common law they felt were applicable and developed their own 
common law precedents, precedent took—and has maintained—a prominent 
position in American jurisprudence.
51
 
Throughout the nineteenth century, stare decisis strengthened in the 
United States.
52
  Chief Justice John Marshall‘s opinion in the landmark 
Marbury v. Madison emphasizes the importance of each judicial decision as 
an element of the developing case law.
53
  Justice Story‘s well-known 
comment about the centrality of adherence to precedent in American law 
shows a similar reverence for all cases being of precedential value: ―A more 
alarming doctrine could not be promulgated by any American court, than that 
it was at liberty to disregard all former rules and decisions, and to decide for 
itself, without reference to the settled course of antecedent principles.‖54  
From Justice Story‘s time to today, adherence to precedent and the application 
of stare decisis have been the most prominent features of the American legal 
system.
55
  Indeed, ―[o]ld common-law attitudes toward precedent are so 
deeply ingrained in the behavior of American lawyers and judges that they 
hardly rise to the conscious level,‖56 and ―American attitudes toward 
precedent are the attitudes of Coke, Blackstone, Marshall, and Kent, although 
courts no longer feel the need to cite to these authors, or the decisions on 
which they relied.‖57  That the concepts of precedent and stare decisis are 
inherent in our legal system is easy to see, but they have been sidestepped, 
without real consideration, by the unpublication system. 
C. Universal Publication in the Twentieth Century 
While neither precedent nor case publication is a precondition for the 
other,
58
 reliable case reports do strengthen the use of precedent.
59
  The desire 
for an American common law noted above led to states designating ―official‖ 
 
51. Mortimer N.S. Sellers, The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States of America, 54 AM. 
J. COMP. L. SUPP. 67, 67 (2006). 
52. Healy, supra note 31, at 87. 
53. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (―It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to particular 
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.‖).  Judge Arnold‘s phrasing of this principle 
in Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000), seems apt: ―Inherent in every 
judicial decision is a declaration and interpretation of a general principle or rule of law.‖  
54. STORY, supra note 42, § 377. 
55. Sellers, supra note 51, at 67. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 73. 
58. BAKER, supra note 19, at 204 (explaining that even when the only record of decision was 
the courts‘ rolls, lawyers and judges would rely upon their own memories and understanding of the 
cases‘ decisions ―vouch[ing] [for] the record‖ as needed). 
59. CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 297 (7th ed. 1964). 
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state reporters to increase the reliability of reports and create more systematic 
coverage in the early nineteenth century.
60
  What had once been the bailiwick 
of motivated jurists and practitioners became a government function, and 
while this provided an official common reference, it was often slow and not as 
useful as the former reporters.
61
  By the end of that century, John B. West and 
the West Publishing Co. changed the face of legal publishing by producing 
more efficient, complete, and systematic reports.
62
  West‘s goal was 
interesting in two respects.  First, he sought ―to collect, arrange in an orderly 
manner and put into convenient and inexpensive form in the shortest possible 
time, the material which every judge and lawyer must use.‖63  This statement 
reveals the importance, visible even to a non-lawyer, that the legal system 
placed on its decisions.  Second, West chose to publish all judicial decisions, 
rather than choosing to publish only a selected subset of them.
64
  This move 
was a departure from past practice and had its critics, but West‘s perception of 
the market was right—―[l]awyers chose the comprehensive [system] . . . 
preferring that all precedent be available.‖65 
In the early twentieth century, lawyers‘ desire for comprehensive 
reporting of actual case decisions was poignantly shown by the rejection of 
the American Law Institute‘s attempt to replace case law with a Restatement 
that extracted the ―best‖ principles of law.66  Unwilling to accept that only 
certain core-principle cases mattered, lawyers continued to cite cases and 
relied upon the Restatement as a useful, but secondary, source.
67
  Attempting 
to again direct lawyers only to certain allegedly more important cases by 
declaring certain cases unworthy at the time of publication has been similarly 
ineffective.  The legal market has demanded publication and now citation of 
these decisions, and has used unpublished decisions throughout the life of the 
unpublication system. 
 
60. Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance, 75 
CAL. L. REV. 15, 19 (1987). 
61. Id. at 20. 
62. Id. at 21. 
63. John B. West, A Symposium of Law Publishers, 23 AM. L. REV. 396, 406 (1889), quoted in 
Thomas A. Woxland, Forever Associated With the Practice of Law: The Early Years of the West 
Publishing Company, 5 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 115, 118–19 (1985). 
64. Berring, supra note 60, at 21. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 23. 
67. Id. 
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D. Limited Publication and Justification 
Complaints about the growing body of case law are certainly not new.
68
  
However, the modern unpublication system was set in motion in 1964 when 
the Federal Judicial Conference recommended that the United States Courts of 
Appeals consider reporting only those decisions that would be of ―general 
precedential value‖ in order to deal with ―the ever increasing practical 
difficulty and economic cost of establishing and maintaining . . . law library 
facilities.‖69  Little action was taken on this suggestion until the 1973 Federal 
Judicial Center‘s Advisory Council on Appellate Justice issued a report, 
Standards for Publication of Judicial Opinions, recommending limited 
publication and citation that included a draft plan for circuit courts to adopt.
70
  
In that report, nonpublication and noncitation seemed to go hand-in-hand 
because permitting citation would create a market for these decisions.
71
  The 
federal circuit courts began to adopt rules limiting publication and citation, 
mostly according to the draft plan.
72
  By 1974, each circuit, which had 
previously published all opinions,
73
 had submitted plans to the Judicial 
Conference for how it would limit publication and citation.
74
 
However, neither the 1964 Conference nor the 1973 Committee openly 
denied precedential status to these new unpublished opinions.
75
  Publication 
plans limited publication to those cases of greatest, broadest precedential 
value but did not inherently diminish the precedential value of other cases.
76
  
In fact, the Advisory Council expressly considered a provision assigning 
 
68. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent—Limited 
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 
1168–69 & n.17 (1978) (noting a prominent federal judge‘s complaints about volume voiced in 
1915). 
69. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 CONFERENCE REPORTS], cited in 
Reynolds & Richman, supra note 68, at 1169 n.17; Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A 
Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219, 219 n.1 (1999). 
70. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 1, at 4. 
71. Id. at 6. 
72. See id. app. I at 22–23; see also Norman R. Williams, The Failings of Originalism: The 
Federal Courts and the Power of Precedent, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 761, 770 n.29, 772 (2004). 
73. David Greenwald & Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1133, 1142 (2002); see also Reynolds & Richman, supra note 68, at 1171. 
74. Berring, supra note 60, at 15–20 (noting West Publishing Co.‘s policy of publishing all 
case opinions rather than some subset of them in a movement toward complete publication); Jon A. 
Strongman, Comment, Unpublished Opinions, Precedent, and the Fifth Amendment: Why Denying 
Unpublished Opinions Precedential Value is Unconstitutional, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 195, 197 (2001) 
(noting that the 1970s proved a breaking point for the practice of uniform publication of federal 
circuit opinions). 
75. Williams, supra note 72, at 770–71. 
76. 1964 CONFERENCE REPORTS, supra note 69, at 11. 
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unpublished opinions no precedential value, but it purposely avoided making 
such a suggestion.
77
  Instead, it attempted to take a position that ―deal[t] with 
use rather than philosophic effect‖;78 that is, it recommended merely denying 
publication and citation of the unpublished opinions and said nothing about 
their actual precedential value.
79
  Though the circuit courts initially took a 
similar approach by adopting publication plans that did not mandate a lesser 
or different precedential status for unpublished decisions,
80
 within a few 
years, most federal court rules made these unpublished cases 
nonprecedential.
81
 
Such a progression, from nonpublished to noncitable to nonprecedential, 
seems logical and in its own way almost necessary.
82
  Limited publication is 
not a new idea; it dates back to the earliest reporters, which were selective in 
what they published.
83
  But declaring decisions to be uncitable and, moreover, 
not precedent was contrary to jurisprudential theory underlying the common 
law paradigm.
84
  This removal of decisions from the body of common law 
 
77. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 1, at 20. 
78. Id. at 20–21.  Justice Alito described this same structural shift somewhat more charitably: 
 
[I]t struck me that the judges of the early 1970s, mostly World War II veterans, 
had responded to the tremendous increase in the appellate caseload with the 
same uncomplaining, can-do attitude that their generation had displayed as 
young men.  They quickly identified a number of techniques that permitted the 
courts of appeals to keep up with their cases without seeming to make 
fundamental alterations in their mode of operation. 
Justice Samuel A. Alito, How Did We Get Here? Where Are We Going?, Keynote Address at 
Washington and Lee University School of Law, Law Review Symposium: Have We Ceased to Be a 
Common Law Country? A Conversation on Unpublished, Depublished, Withdrawn and Per Curiam 
Opinions SSA-01710 (Mar. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Alito Symposium Address] (transcript available at 
http://www.law.com/pdf/dc/alito_unpublished.pdf). 
79. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 1, at 20. 
80. Williams, supra note 72, at 771. 
81. Id. at 772. 
82. ―Unpublished‖ cases that remained citable and precedential would be sought out despite 
their formal publication status, but creating a rule that a decision is both noncitable and 
nonprecedential effectively removes that decision from the body of common law.  Only by restricting 
opinions on all three grounds (publication, citation, and precedent) could one hope to make some 
opinions truly ―disposable.‖  This, of course, was unsuccessful because practitioners placed value on 
these opinions despite their diminished status.  See generally, e.g., Lauren K. Robel, The Practice of 
Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an Interpretive 
Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399 (2002) (examining the recent surveys of federal judges and 
lawyers); Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and 
Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940 (1989) 
(examining a survey of how government litigants use unpublished opinions). 
83. Robert J. Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial Opinions: A 
Reassessment, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119, 121 (1994). 
84. Id. at 128–45. 
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was a fundamental shift in the common law system.
85
  Even in the early days 
of Yearbooks or the unsettled post-Revolution days of early American courts, 
no matter how scarce the record, cases could always be cited to the court as 
evidence of its past rulings.  In the unpublication system of the mid-1970s, 
however, federal courts were unwilling to be bound by what they had done in 
a similar case in the past; in fact, they were unwilling to even be told about 
it.
86
  Not because they had decided it inapplicable, but because another panel 
of the court had decided ex ante, at the time of the decision, that it would not 
aid future decision-makers.
87
  Neither the 1973 Committee‘s report nor its 
recommendation reveal that any consideration was given to whether the 
federal circuits had the power to remove some cases from the body of 
precedent, whether such a move would be constitutional, or whether 
jurisprudentially this was a good idea.  What we now know is that the market 
for these decisions never abated (and they are now published thanks to 
improved technology) and that both judges and lawyers continue to believe 
they ought to be citable (as evidenced by the new FRAP 32.1). 
E. Unraveling of the Unpublication System 
The unpublication system is at its base a simple idea.  One way to reduce 
―the ever increasing practical difficulty and economic cost of establishing and 
maintaining private and public law library facilities‖88 is to publish fewer 
 
85. English and early American practice uniformly allowed citation to and reliance upon prior 
decisions regardless of their publication status.  Modern English practice is similar to its historical 
practice: unreported cases are unlikely to be cited but may be cited, if appropriate.  See ROBERT J. 
MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 104 (1990).  But see F. Allan Hanson, From Key Numbers to Keywords: How Automation 
Has Transformed the Law, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 563, 565–66 (2002) (quoting Roderick Munday, The 
Limits of Citation Determined, 80 LAW SOC‘Y GAZETTE 1337, 1337 (1983) (claiming the British 
courts are ―restricting the use of unreported materials which the computer revolution has suddenly 
made available to the profession.  In particular, the House of Lords . . . has effectively outlawed the 
citation of unreported cases in argument before it‖)). 
86. Arnold, supra note 69, at 221 (―The bar is gagged.  We are perfectly free to depart from 
past opinions if they are unpublished, and whether to publish them is entirely our own choice.‖).  
87. This shift was borne not out of a philosophical or jurisprudential need to prune the law; 
rather, it was created because of a need to reduce the expense of publishing, collecting, and 
maintaining law libraries as well as reducing the workload of the federal judiciary and lawyers.  See 
STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 1, at 6–8.  Aside from a general comment that 
―[u]nlimited proliferation of published opinions constitutes a burden and a threat to a cohesive body 
of law,‖ the balance of the Committee‘s seven factors are made up of pragmatic concerns about 
workload and logistics—many of which are wholly inapplicable in today‘s legal information setting.  
Id. at 6.  Without diminishing the true economic and pragmatic need to deal with the problem of 
volume, which is a real one, it is troubling that the jurisprudential problems were not explicitly raised 
and weighed in to the proposed solution. 
88. 1964 CONFERENCE REPORTS, supra note 69, at 11 (cited in Arnold, supra note 69, at 219 
n.1; Reynolds & Richman, supra note 68, at 1169 n.17).  A 1990 Federal Courts Study Committee, 
created by Congress in 1988, recognized that the decision to limit publication and citation was 
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cases.  However, to achieve this, the cases must be declared uncitable, or 
publishers will continue to publish them.
89
  Finally, if the case decisions were 
unpublished and uncitable, perhaps they are not precedent.  This last piece, 
the least justified and most important piece, is the only one of the three that 
remains. 
This tripartite scheme has unraveled under the natural pressure of the 
American legal system.  Publication of these decisions has returned to near 
universality.
90
  Citation of these decisions has been returned by federal 
procedural rule.
91
  What remains is the question of the precedential value of 
these decisions—the very ―morass of jurisprudence‖ the 1973 Committee was 
unwilling to wade into. 
Comprehensive publication of these opinions is now a foregone 
conclusion.  Technological advances have drastically altered the landscape of 
legal publishing and legal research over the last thirty to forty years.
92
  
Unpublished decisions, despite their moniker, are typically included in the 
commercial databases right alongside published decisions, such that a search 
for a given term in the Sixth Circuit, for example, retrieves both published and 
unpublished cases containing that term.  Similarly, a search using West‘s 
Keynotes or Lexis‘s similar system retrieves both published and unpublished 
cases.  Citation is now also a settled issue.
93
  Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 32.1 permits citation of all decisions issued after January 1, 2007.
94
  
The federal rulemaking process that led to this final rule is a long one, well-
detailed elsewhere.
95
  It is worth noting, however, that the Advisory 
Committee, which studied the issue and drafted the rule, was firm in its 
support of the new rule.
96
  Most importantly, at least for the purposes of this 
 
always one of pragmatism and never one of principle, explaining, ―[t]he policy in courts of appeals 
of not publishing certain opinions, and concomitantly restricting their citation, has always been a 
concession to perceived necessity.‖  FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 
STUDY COMMITTEE 130 (1990). 
89. This happened anyway, regardless of the citation rules, which demonstrates the legal 
community‘s understanding of the value of these cases.  See Gant, supra note 4, at 709–10; 
Shuldberg, supra note 4, at 551.  See generally E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 
§ 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. 2899, 2913 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006)); WEST‘S FEDERAL 
APPENDIX. 
90. Gant, supra note 4, at 709–10; Shuldberg, supra note 4, at 551.  See generally E-
Government Act of 2002, § 205(a)(5); WEST‘S FEDERAL APPENDIX. 
91. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1. 
92. Shuldberg, supra note 4, at 551 (―These historic rationales for the limited publication/no-
citation plans warrant re-examination in light of current technology.‖). 
93. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1. 
94. Id. 
95. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 94–106; Schiltz, supra note 18, at 1434–58. 
96. At its April 2004 meeting, every member, save one, spoke in favor of the rule, and most did 
so in very serious terms, arguing that ―an Article III court should not be able to forbid parties from 
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Article, is that Committee members, including Judge John G. Roberts, Jr. 
(now Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court) and Judge Samuel A. 
Alito (now Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court), noted that 
in their circuits, which already liberalized citation to allow unpublished 
opinions, no delay, backlogs, increased workload, or other problems were 
occurring, and both favored the rule.
97
  Approval of this rule was also 
widespread among jurists and lawyers practicing in the federal system.
98
 
What needs to be done ―is to wade into the ‗morass of jurisprudence‘ and 
confront the issue of precedential status.  It is an issue of both principle and 
pragmatism, of what we must do and what we ought to do.‖ 99  To continue to 
allow the tail of practicality to wag the jurisprudential dog is to perpetuate a 
jurisprudence of doubt.  Denying the precedential value of these decisions, 
now widely published and freely citable, is fraught with constitutional 
infirmities and practical problems. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR RETURNING TO PRECEDENT 
There are numerous arguments for acknowledging the precedential status 
of all opinions.
100
  First, the premises on which the unpublication system was 
built were faulty in the mid-1970s, and the ground has only shifted even 
further out from underneath them since then. Second, the practice of declaring 
some opinions not precedent at the time of decision is unconstitutional 
because it is outside of the judicial power granted by the Constitution and 
because it violates equal protection and due process.
101
  Finally, both legal and 
lay audiences continue to believe in the power of precedent.
102
  The 
 
citing back to it the public actions that the court itself has taken‖ and 
 
[i]t is antithetical to American values and to the common law system for a court 
to forbid a party or an attorney from calling the court‘s attention to its own prior 
decisions, from arguing to the court that its prior decisions were or were not 
correct, and from arguing that the court should or should not act consistently 
with those prior decisions in the present case. 
Minutes of the Spring 2004 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 7–8 (Apr. 13–
14, 2004) [hereinafter Advisory Committee], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ 
app0404.pdf.  Other members called no-citation rules ―extreme‖ and ―ludicrous,‖ and one member-
judge noted that limited citation rules made federal circuit judges ―the only government officials who 
can shield themselves from being confronted with their past actions.‖  Id. at 8. 
97. Id. at 7–8; see also Cleveland, supra note 12, at 102. 
98. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 102–03; Schiltz, supra note 18, at 1453–57; Minutes of the 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 11 (June 17–18, 2004), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/june2004.pdf. 
99. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 106. 
100. Id. at 106–73. 
101. Id. at 147–61. 
102. Id. at 162–73. 
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expectation that the way a court decided a case yesterday is predictive of how 
it will (and ought to) rule tomorrow is well-ingrained in our legal system.
103
  
This powerful concept of how precedent underlies our legal system has 
sustained demand of unpublished opinions throughout the thirty-five-year 
unpublication system‘s operation, and it has led to the return of citation of 
these decisions.
104
  Among this panoply of arguments arrayed against the 
unpublication system, the constitutional arguments are ripe for Supreme Court 
review.  While the others provide background for any argument to the Court, 
it is the core constitutional claims that are most likely to gain certiorari. 
Potential constitutional challenges could be brought on any of three bases: 
1) judicial power under Article III meant the power to decide cases according 
to precedent; 2) nonprecedential opinions allow for unequal treatment of 
similarly situated parties in a way that violates the Equal Protection Clause; 
and 3) the removal of the ability to rely on all prior cases as precedent, a well-
established feature of the common law, violates the Due Process Clause. 
The fundamental constitutional infirmity with the process of denying the 
precedential status of unpublished cases is that Article III of the United States 
Constitution does not give federal courts the authority to decide which of their 
cases are precedential and which are good only for a single time and place.  
The crux of this argument is that all cases decided by the federal courts are 
precedent.  The foremost proponent of this view, in both time and importance, 
has been Judge Richard Arnold.
105
  Some proposed such a view of precedent 
prior to Judge Arnold‘s writings,106 and many picked up the banner after 
Judge Arnold‘s provocative decision in Anastasoff v. United States.107  In 
 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 
1054 (8th Cir. 2000); Arnold, supra note 69, at 221. 
106. See, e.g., In re Rules of U.S. Ct. of App. for 10th Cir., Adopted Nov. 18, 1986, 955 F.2d 
36, 37 (1992) (Halloway, Barrett & Baldock, JJ., dissenting) (―Each ruling, published or 
unpublished, involves the facts of a particular case and the application of law—to the case.  
Therefore all rulings of this court are precedents, like it or not, and we cannot consign any of them to 
oblivion by merely banning their citation.‖); Bader, supra note 44, at 9–11; Henry Paul Monaghan, 
Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 754–55 (1988). 
107. Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West’s Federal Appendix: The Ground 
Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 1–2 (2002); Richard B. Cappalli, The 
Common Law’s Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755, 759 (2003); 
Charles R. Eloshway, Say It Ain’t So: Non-Precedential Opinions Exceed the Limits of Article III 
Powers, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 632, 632–33 (2002); Kenneth Anthony Laretto, Precedent, Judicial 
Power, and the Constitutionality of “No-Citation” Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 STAN. 
L. REV. 1037, 1037–38 (2002); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: 
What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 73 (2001); 
Penelope Pether, Take a Letter, Your Honor: Outing the Judicial Epistemology of Hart v. Massanari, 
62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1553, 1557 (2005); Johanna S. Schiavoni, Who’s Afraid of Precedent?: 
The Debate Over the Precedential Value of Unpublished Opinions, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1864 
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Anastasoff, Judge Arnold authored an Eighth Circuit panel decision ruling that 
denying decisions precedential status exceeded the court‘s ―judicial power‖ 
granted by Article III.
108
  This decision was later vacated when the United 
States changed its policy and made the case itself moot.
109
  However, this 
reading of Article III still has considerable merit.
110
  Article III, Section 1, 
Clause 1 of the United States Constitution states: ―The judicial power of the 
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior 
Courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.‖111  The 
term ―judicial power‖ is not any further defined, but Judge Arnold sets forth a 
persuasive argument that the Framers understood a grant of limited power and 
that power does not extend to rendering nonprecedential opinions.
112
  As a 
first principle, Anastasoff finds that every judicial decision is a declaration of 
law, which must be applied in subsequent similar cases.
113
  The Framers were 
influenced by the writings of Coke, Hale, and Blackstone, which describe a 
common law system in which ―the judge‘s duty to follow precedent derives 
from the nature of the judicial power itself.‖114  Such authors viewed each 
decision of the court as adding to the body of law, ―the law in that case, being 
solemnly declared and determined, what before was uncertain, and perhaps 
indifferent, is now become a permanent rule.‖115  The Framers‘ writings 
reveal a similar understanding of the centrality of precedent to the judicial 
power of the early American courts.  For example, James Madison understood 
 
(2002); Steve Sheppard, The Unpublished Opinion: How Richard Arnold’s Anastasoff Opinion is 
Saving America’s Courts from Themselves, 2002 ARK. L. NOTES 85, 86 (2002); Michael B.W. 
Sinclair, Anastasoff Versus Hart: The Constitutionality and Wisdom of Denying Precedential 
Authority to Circuit Court Decisions, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 695, 695, 699 (2003); Strongman, supra 
note 74, at 204; Jennifer Adams, Comment, Law Today; Gone Tomorrow, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 659, 
661 (2001); William J. Miller, Note, Chipping Away at the Dam: Anastasoff v. United States and the 
Future of Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals and Beyond , 50 DRAKE L. 
REV. 181, 183 (2001); Sheree L.K. Nitta, Note, The Price of Precedent: Anastasoff v. United States, 
23 U. HAW. L. REV. 795, 796 (2001); Lance A. Wade, Note, Honda Meets Anastasoff: The 
Procedural Due Process Argument Against Rules Prohibiting Citation to Unpublished Judicial 
Decisions, 42 B.C. L. REV. 695, 731–32 (2001). 
108. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900, vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). 
109. Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d, 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000). 
110. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 130–45. 
111. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1. 
112. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900. 
113. Id. at 899–900 (―Inherent in every judicial decision is a declaration and interpretation of a 
general principle or rule of law.  This declaration of law is authoritative to the extent necessary for 
the decision, and must be applied in subsequent cases to similarly situated parties.  These principles, 
which form the doctrine of precedent, were well established and well regarded at the time this nation 
was founded.  The Framers of the Constitution considered these principles to derive from the nature 
of judicial power, and intended that they would limit the judicial power delegated to the courts by 
Article III of the Constitution.‖ (citations omitted)). 
114. Id. at 901. 
115. Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69). 
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the courts as being bounded by the ―authoritative force‖ of ―judicial 
precedents‖ and observing the ―‗obligation arising from judicial expositions 
of the law on succeeding judges.‘‖116  Similarly, Alexander Hamilton 
emphatically stated that ―[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is 
indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, 
which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that 
comes before them.‖117 
However, ―the Anti-Federalists also assumed that federal judicial 
decisions would become authorities in subsequent cases.‖118  For example, the 
Essays of Brutus Number XV reveals concern that ―one adjudication will form 
a precedent to the next, and this to a following one.  These cases will 
immediately affect individuals only; so that a series of determinations will 
probably take place before even the people will be informed of them,‖119 
while the Federal Farmer expressed the concern that the federal courts to be 
established had ―no precedents in this country, as yet, to regulate the divisions 
in equity as in Great Britain; equity, therefore, in the supreme court for many 
years will be mere discretion.‖120  The contemporary writings reveal a broad 
and deep-seated understanding that the courts under the new United States 
Constitution would be of binding authority.
121
  For the Framers, the concept of 
precedent was part and parcel of their understanding of judicial power, a 
power that was bounded by an obligation to find the law rather than make 
it.
122
  It seems contrary to every notion of judicial power at the time of the 
founding that the Framers would have intended a system (or understood one) 
that would allow federal courts to make a decision good in only a single time 
and place and having no bearing on later decisions, or that courts could 
without reason or explanation depart from past decisions.  In addition, the 
Framers did not possess the same ―correspondence‖ between publication and 
 
116. Id. at 902 n.10 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 
1831), reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES 
MADISON 390, 391 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981)). 
117. Id. at 902 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (ALEXANDER HAMILTON)). 
118. Id. at 902–03 (citing ESSAYS OF BRUTUS NO. XV (Mar. 20, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 437, 441 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL 
FARMER NO. 3 (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 234, 244. 
119. ESSAYS OF BRUTUS NO. XV, supra note 118, at 441. 
120. LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER NO. 3, supra note 118, at 224. 
121. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 903; see also Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the 
Horizontal Force of Precedent, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1075, 1101 (2003) (―[R]emarks on the 
subject of precedent of these most prominent Federalists and Anti-Federalists show that they adhered 
to a theory of precedent basically consistent with the major common-law treatises of the day, and that 
they believed that the accumulating force of precedents would, over time, tend to authoritatively ‗fix‘ 
the meaning of the Constitution.  One theme to be found in their remarks is that adherence to 
precedent forestalls the accumulation of arbitrary power in the courts . . . .‖). 
122. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 901–02. 
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precedent that underlies the 1973 Committee‘s work.  ―Unpublished‖ did not 
historically mean ―unprecedential,‖ and to equate the two flies in the face of 
the expectations and experiences of English common law and the founding 
generation of this country.
123
  Judge Arnold summarized his case for the 
Framers‘ understanding of precedent as an inherent aspect of judicial power: 
 
To summarize, in the late eighteenth century, the doctrine of 
precedent was well-established in legal practice (despite the 
absence of a reporting system), regarded as an immemorial 
custom, and valued for its role in past struggles for liberty.  
The duty of courts to follow their prior decisions was 
understood to derive from the nature of the judicial power 
itself and to separate it from a dangerous union with the 
legislative power.  The statements of the Framers indicate an 
understanding and acceptance of these principles.  We 
conclude therefore that, as the Framers intended, the doctrine 
of precedent limits the ―judicial power‖ delegated to the 
courts in Article III.
124
 
 
A second constitutional infirmity in the denial of precedent to unpublished 
cases is that it violates the Equal Protection Clause.
125
  The practice of 
designating some opinions as nonprecedential violates equal protection 
because it treats similarly situated litigants in a disparate manner.
126
  This 
unequal treatment inhibits a fundamental right, and the government‘s 
pragmatic justification is insufficient to meet the strict scrutiny standard.
127
  
 
123. Id. at 903 (―[T]he Framers did not regard this absence of a reporting system as an 
impediment to the precedential authority of a judicial decision. . . .  [J]udges and lawyers of the day 
recognized the authority of unpublished decisions even when they were established only by memory 
or by a lawyer‘s unpublished memorandum.‖); see also BAKER, supra note 19, at 204 (noting that 
even the earliest common law courts allowed counsel to vouch for the record of prior cases when 
urging the court to decide similarly). 
124. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 903; see also STORY, supra note 42, §§ 377–78 (―The case is not 
alone considered as decided and settled; but the principles of the decision are held, as precedents and 
authority, to bind future cases of the same nature.  This is the constant practice under our whole 
system of jurisprudence.  Our ancestors brought it with them, when they first emigrated to this 
country; and it is, and always has been considered, as the great security of our rights, our liberties, 
and our property.  It is on this account, that our law is justly deemed certain, and founded in 
permanent principles, and not dependent upon the caprice or will of particular judges.  A more 
alarming doctrine could not be promulgated by any American court, than that it was at liberty to 
disregard all former rules and decisions, and to decide for itself, without reference to the settled 
course of antecedent principles.‖). 
125. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 107, at 204; Strongman, supra note 74, at 215–17; Wade, 
supra note 107, at 714. 
126. Strongman, supra note 74, at 220. 
127. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 147–55; see, e.g., 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 1116–
1120 (2007) (setting forth the standards for scrutiny). 
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The unpublication system‘s unequal treatment of similarly situated parties—
actually the exact same party—is apparent in a pair of cases in which the 
Dallas Area Rapid Transit authority (DART) received diametrically opposed 
decisions from the Fifth Circuit without explanation in a span of just three 
years.  In 1998 in Anderson v. DART, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas held that ―DART is a political subdivision of the 
state of Texas, and is therefore immune from suit under the Eleventh 
Amendment,‖128 and the Fifth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion.129  
When the Supreme Court denied certiorari, DART must have felt about as 
secure as possible that the rule establishing its immunity was settled in the 
Fifth Circuit.  Yet while the federal district court applied this rule again in 
2000 in Williams v. DART,
130
 this time the Fifth Circuit held that DART was 
not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity based on Fifth Circuit case law 
dating back to 1986.
131
  The Fifth Circuit in Williams is wholly dismissive of 
the prior result in Anderson (and two similar cases).
132
  So, because the prior 
case holding DART immune was unpublished, it was not accorded 
precedential weight under the Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5.4,
133
 and the court felt 
free to depart from it without distinguishing it in some fashion (which it could 
not do because the legally relevant facts were identical) or overruling the law 
on which the case was based.
134  
Two identical cases decided within two years 
were decided differently based not on factually distinguishable factors or a 
change in the governing law, but merely the whim of one panel choosing not 
 
128. Anderson v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, No. CA3:97-CV-1834-BC, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15493, at *24 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 1998), aff’d per curiam, Anderson v. DART, 180 F.3d 
265 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1062 (1999). 
129. Anderson, 180 F.3d 265, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1062 (1999). 
130. The district court stated that ―‗[i]t is firmly established that DART is a governmental unit 
or instrumentality of the State of Texas‘‖ and therefore entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.  
Williams v. DART, 256 F.3d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 2001) (Smith, Jones & DeMoss, JJ., dissenting) 
(quoting from district court opinion) (dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc). 
131. Williams v. DART, 242 F.3d 315, 318–19 (5th Cir. 2001). 
132. Id. at 319 (―Although all three cases upheld DART‘s immunity from suit, they are neither 
binding nor persuasive in this context.‖). 
133. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4 (―Unpublished opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996, are not 
precedent, except under the doctrine of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case . . . .‖). 
134. Williams, 242 F.3d at 322 (holding that ―[t]he district court therefore erred in finding 
DART immune from suit‖).  This decision was not without a strong dissent.  Williams, 256 F.3d at 
260 (Smith, Jones & DeMoss, JJ., dissenting) (dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en 
banc) (―The refusal of the en banc court to rehear this case en banc is unfortunate, for this is an 
opportunity to revisit the questionable practice of denying precedential status to unpublished 
opinions. . . .  I respectfully dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc, which would have given 
this court an opportunity to examine the question of unpublished opinions generally, an issue that is 
important to the fair administration of justice in this circuit.‖). 
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to publish.  Not only was the defendant DART similarly situated in each case, 
but also as far as legally relevant facts go, it was identically situated.
135
 
Another case that demonstrates the unequal treatment wrought by the 
unpublication system can be found in the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in United 
States v. Rivera-Sanchez.
136
  In that case, the Ninth Circuit was forced to 
admit that no less than twenty prior panels had issued unpublished decisions 
on a certain issue, and those decisions split three different ways on the 
answer.
137
  For three years, these Ninth Circuit cases escaped review and 
provided different answers to the same legal question.  If not for the Rivera-
Sanchez court‘s request during oral argument that counsel prepare and provide 
a list of unpublished cases, this unequal disposition of cases would have 
continued.
138
  The confusion within the circuit was resolved only because the 
Ninth Circuit itself ignored its own noncitation rule.
139
 
These are not isolated examples.  In fact, such situations may be common.  
―Empirical evidence suggests that cases such as Christie and Anderson are 
more common than one might think.‖140  Unpublished cases contain ―a 
noticeable number of reversals, dissents, or concurrences,‖ and ―significant 
associations between case outcome and judicial characteristics.‖141  This 
treatment of litigants violates equal protection.  That is, ―failing to give 
unpublished opinions precedential effect raises the very specter described by 
the Eighth Circuit [in Anastasoff]: that like cases will be decided in unlike 
ways‖142 
The Supreme Court has made clear that ―[f]ew, if any, interests under the 
Constitution are more fundamental than the right to a fair trial by ‗impartial‘ 
jurors,‖143 and it has repeatedly held other concerns, such as the right to 
 
135. See Williams, 256 F.3d at 260–61 (―If the Anderson panel had published its opinion, it 
would have been binding on the panel in the instant case—Williams—and the result here would have 
been different.  Based, however, on the mere fortuity that the Anderson panel decided not to publish, 
our panel in Williams was free to disagree with Anderson and to deny to DART the same immunity 
that Anderson had conferred on it less than two years earlier.  What is the hapless litigant or attorney, 
or for that matter a federal district judge or magistrate judge, to do?‖). 
136. 222 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000). 
137. Id. at 1063. 
138. Id. 
139. See 9TH CIR. R. 36-3 (barring citation of unpublished opinions except for extremely 
limited purposes). 
140. Williams, 256 F.3d at 262 (Smith, Jones & DeMoss, JJ., dissenting) (dissenting from 
denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (referring to Anderson v. DART, 180 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 
1999) (per curiam) (unpublished), and Christie v. United States, No. 91-2375MN, 1992 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 38446 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (per curiam) (unpublished)). 
141. Merritt & Brudney, supra note 107, at 120. 
142. Id. at 119 (referring to, in part, Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 901, 905 (8th 
Cir. 2000)). 
143. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991). 
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counsel, to be important in protecting the ―fundamental right to a fair trial.‖144  
As such, strict scrutiny must be applied to the government‘s discrimination.  
The government cannot meet the standard of demonstrating that this 
discrimination inhibiting a fundamental right is necessary to achieve a 
compelling government interest.  The Court has rejected claims that 
administrative efficiency was a compelling government interest sufficient to 
justify discrimination based on gender.
145
  Likewise, the Court has struck 
down a statutory provision that inhibited a fundamental right by applying 
strict scrutiny, stating, ―[s]ince the classification here touches on the 
fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged 
by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest.‖146  
The Court has rejected arguments that administrative needs or budgetary 
benefits of the program were compelling state interests in the face of such a 
fundamental right.
147
  This denial of precedent is not sufficiently justified or 
narrowly tailored.
148
 
Finally, the practice of denial of precedent to some cases violates due 
process.  As with the equal protection claim, which has been raised by 
commentators but not ruled on by the Court, it has been suggested that the 
scheme of declaring some decisions nonprecedential violates due process 
requirements.
149
  The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides that: ―No person shall . . . be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .‖150  This clause has 
been held to contain both substantive and procedural requirements.
151
  The 
substantive due process objection is similar to the equal protection objection 
outlined above.
152
  The right to a fair trial, as embodied in the requirement that 
courts should be bound to rely upon prior decisions (or distinguish them or 
 
144. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 368 (1993) (right to counsel exists to protect the 
fundamental right to a fair trial); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 137 n.8 (1994) 
(peremptory challenges are a means to ensure the fundamental right to a fair trial); Chandler v. 
Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 577 (1981) (Judicial control of media coverage of court proceedings are 
constitutional when exercised to ―protect the fundamental right of the accused to a fair trial.‖). 
145. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (―[O]ur prior decisions make clear that, 
although efficacious administration of governmental programs is not without some importance, ‗the 
Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.‘‖) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 
U.S. 645, 656 (1972)). 
146. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). 
147. Id. at 636–38. 
148. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 155. 
149. Miller, supra note 107, at 204; Analisa Pratt, Comment, A Call for Uniformity in 
Appellate Courts’ Rules Regarding Citation of Unpublished Opinions , 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
195, 214 (2005); Wade, supra note 107, at 722–31. 
150. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
151. Pratt, supra note 149, at 214; Wade, supra note 107, at 717, 722–32. 
152. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 156–61. 
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change the law), is a ―fundamental right‖ and ―implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty‖ as set forth in the Constitution and intrinsic to our judicial 
system.
153
  The practice of issuing nonprecedential opinions infringes upon 
that right
154
 and must, therefore, be subject to strict scrutiny and justified by 
showing that the action is the least burdensome means of achieving a 
compelling interest.
155
  As discussed above in the equal protection analysis, 
the practice of declaring opinions in advance to hold no precedential weight is 
not the least burdensome means of achieving any compelling state interest.
156
 
The procedural due process requirement guarantees that people who are 
deprived of life, liberty, or property ―are entitled to a reasonable level of 
judicial or administrative process.‖157  This ―duty of government to follow a 
fair process of decisionmaking when it acts to deprive a person of his 
possessions‖ serves ―not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual‖ 
but also ―[i]ts purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession 
of property from arbitrary encroachment—to minimize substantively unfair or 
mistaken deprivations of property.‖158  The Supreme Court has been skeptical 
of the abrogation of a deeply rooted common law judicial procedure without 
adequate replacement, often finding that such an abrogation violated litigants‘ 
procedural due process rights.
159
  A parallel case, Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 
demonstrates the due process violation present in denying a well-established 
common law procedure.
160
  In Honda, the Supreme Court invalidated, on due 
process grounds, Oregon‘s departure from the well-established common law 
procedure of judicial oversight of punitive damage awards.
161
  The Court ruled 
that the practice of judicial oversight of punitive damage verdicts remained a 
 
153. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
154. Cf. Loritz v. U.S. Ct. of App. for 9th Cir., 382 F.3d 990, 992 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding a 
litigant whose case was disposed of by unpublished opinion lacked Article III standing because he 
was asserting due process rights of later litigants).  But see id. at 993 (Beam, J., concurring) (stating 
that the argument that prior unpublished case law, if it were precedential, would dictate a different 
outcome creates the necessary standing). 
155. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (stating that ―classifications affecting 
fundamental rights are given the most exacting scrutiny‖ (citation omitted)); Harper v. Va. Bd. of 
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (―We have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and 
liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or 
restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined.‖). 
156. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 155. 
157. Pratt, supra note 149, at 214; Wade, supra note 107, at 717. 
158. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972). 
159. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994) (holding that ―Oregon has removed 
that safeguard [which the common law provided] without providing any substitute procedure and 
without any indication that the danger of arbitrary awards has in any way subsided over time‖); see 
also Pratt, supra note 149, at 214; Wade, supra note 107, at 717. 
160. See Honda Motor Co., 512 U.S. at 430. 
161. Id. at 432. 
710 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [92:685 
part of common law from 1763 England to present-day American courts.
162
  
Based on this well-established protection in the common law, the Court held 
Oregon‘s statute denying remittur violative of due process.163  Honda 
provides, by analogy, a simple but persuasive argument that the practice of 
denying precedential status to unpublished decisions violates procedural due 
process.
164
  The practice of referring to past cases as establishing the 
governing law stretches back further and is of far more fundamental 
importance than the judicial oversight of punitive damage awards.
165
  Despite 
the efficiency gains of the unpublication system, they must give way to due 
process rights.
166
 
These constitutional arguments seem both strong and, thus far, 
unexamined.
167
  They should be examined.  The Supreme Court‘s past 
jurisprudence on the unpublication system reveals an uneasiness with the 
practice.
168
  Likewise, several individual Justices have expressed concern that 
unpublished opinions are a troubling practice or at odds with historical 
notions of precedent.
169
 
IV. SUPREME COURT‘S PRIOR RULINGS AND PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI 
DENIALS 
The question of what the Supreme Court might do must begin by 
examining what it has done in the past.
170
  The Court has granted certiorari on 
only a single case squarely addressing the issue, and it decided that case on 
 
162. Id. at 421–29. 
163. Id. at 430. 
164. Wade, supra note 107, at 722. 
165. Id. at 723 (―The history of lawyers citing to all prior judicial decisions is much lengthier 
than the comprehensive punitive damage review considered ‗deeply rooted‘ by the Honda Court.  
Whereas the Honda Court traced the practice of punitive damage review to the mid-seventeenth 
century, the ability to cite prior decisions dates back four hundred years further—to the middle of the 
thirteenth century.  The long history of this citation procedure is sufficient to indicate a deeply-rooted 
common law practice in accord with Honda.‖). 
166. Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) (―[T]he Constitution recognizes higher 
values than speed and efficiency.  Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and 
the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a 
vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize 
praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.‖). 
167. Nonconstitutional arguments based on the underlying mistaken premises and community 
understanding of precedent also are unexamined.  See Cleveland, supra note 12, at 106–30, 162–73. 
168. See infra Part IV. 
169. See infra Part V. 
170. Though the Court is not bound by its past decisions in the purest precedential sense, stare 
decisis is, of course, a powerful factor.  See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
854 (1992).  This Article is confined to an examination of what the Court has done regarding the 
specific issue of unpublished opinions. 
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jurisdictional grounds and did not reach the unpublication issue.
171
  The Court 
has denied certiorari on numerous cases directly raising the issue,
172
 and on 
several occasions it has expressed concern at the unpublication practice in the 
context of other cases.
173
  Individual Justices, writing in dissents or separate 
concurrences, have also expressed concern that unpublished cases were 
evading review or being improperly used.
174
 
A. Supreme Court’s Single Grant of Certiorari 
The Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutionality or propriety 
of the unpublication system directly.  It did accept certiorari on the issue once, 
shortly after the unpublication system‘s inception, but it chose not to address 
the issue in its opinion.
175
  In Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections 
 
171. Browder v. Dir., Dep‘t of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 258 & n.1 (1978) (After granting 
certiorari on the issue, the Court did not address it.). 
172. Untracht v. Fikri, 128 S. Ct. 1666 (2008); Spiegel v. Volvo Cars N. Am., L.L.C., 128 S. 
Ct. 911 (2008); Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 128 S. Ct. 669 (2007); Family Fare, Inc. v. NLRB, 127 
S. Ct. 2991 (2007); Wheeler v. Mo. Dir. of Revenue, 549 U.S. 1266 (2007); Stilley v. Marschewski, 
549 U.S. 1112 (2007); Shefchuk v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 549 U.S. 952 (2006); N. Pacifica L.L.C. v. 
City of Pacifica, 546 U.S. 1138 (2006); Heavrin v. Schilling, 546 U.S. 1137 (2006); O.S.C. Co. v. 
Zymblosky, 546 U.S. 936 (2005); Rana v. United States, 546 U.S. 877 (2005); Seils v. Rochester 
City Sch. Dist., 544 U.S. 920 (2005); Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 543 U.S. 819 (2004); Schmier 
v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 543 U.S. 818 (2004); Rodriguez v. HFP, Inc., 541 U.S. 903 (2004); Carey v. 
Knox County, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004); Test v. Comm‘r, 538 U.S. 961 (2003); Martin v. KeyCorp, 538 
U.S. 961 (2003); Berrafato v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 537 U.S. 1233 (2003); 
S. Clay Prods., Inc. v. United Catalysts, Inc., 537 U.S. 1189 (2003); Lewin v. Cooke, 537 U.S. 881 
(2002); Lemelson Med. v. Symbol Techs., 537 U.S. 825 (2002); Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. 
Prudential Assurance Co., 536 U.S. 959 (2002); Wendt v. Mineta, 536 U.S. 941 (2002); Mims v. 
United States, 534 U.S. 1132 (2002); Pappas v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 534 U.S. 1129 (2002); Segal v. 
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 534 U.S. 1041 (2001); Bostron v. Massanari, 534 U.S. 896 (2001); Knight 
v. Maleng, 534 U.S. 820 (2001); Smyly v. IBM, 528 U.S. 982 (1999); Schmier v. Jennings, 522 U.S. 
1149 (1998); Culp v. Hood, 519 U.S. 1042 (1996); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Carroll, 516 U.S. 816 (1995); 
Friedman v. Montgomery County, 489 U.S. 1079 (1989); Van Sant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 475 U.S. 
1082 (1986), reh’g denied, 476 U.S. 1131 (1986); Do-Right Auto Sales v. U.S. Ct. of App. for 7th 
Cir., 429 U.S. 917 (1976). 
173. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 425 & n.3 (1993); Comm‘r v. McCoy, 
484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322–23 (1987). 
174. See Langston v. United States, 506 U.S. 930, 930 (1992) (White & Thomas, JJ., 
dissenting); Costa v. United States, 506 U.S. 929, 929 (1992) (White & O‘Connor, JJ., dissenting); 
Waller v. United States, 504 U.S. 962, 962–65 (1992) (White & O‘Connor, JJ., dissenting); Smith v. 
United States, 502 U.S. 1017, 1019–20 & n.* (1991) (Blackmun, O‘Connor & Souter, JJ., dissenting) 
(―The fact that the Court of Appeals‘ opinion is unpublished is irrelevant.  Nonpublication must not 
be a convenient means to prevent review.  An unpublished opinion may have a lingering effect in the 
Circuit and surely is as important to the parties concerned as is a published opinion.‖); Taylor v. 
United States, 493 U.S. 906, 906–07 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring); St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Bhd. 
of Ry., 484 U.S. 907, 907 (1987) (White & Brennan, JJ., dissenting); Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 
U.S. 965, 965–68 (1983) (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun., JJ., dissenting); Hyman v. Rickman, 446 
U.S. 989, 990–91 (1980) (Blackmun, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). 
175. Browder, 434 U.S. at 258 n.1 (After granting certiorari on the issue, the Court did not 
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of Illinois, the Supreme Court heard the case of petitioner Browder, who 
alleged that his state court criminal conviction should be reversed because it 
was based on a warrantless arrest, search, and seizure, and because of 
irregularities in the federal courts‘ habeas review of his case.176  The sixth and 
final of Browder‘s questions presented to the Court was: ―Does a federal court 
of appeals have the inherent power to withhold any of its opinions from 
publication and to a priori deprive such opinions of precedential value?‖177  
Browder argued in his brief that the federal circuit courts do not have the 
power to deprive their decisions of precedential effect.
178
  Browder argued, 
first, that unpublication of opinions creates the possibility that the decision of 
the Seventh Circuit panel in his case was contrary to the law of the Seventh 
Circuit.
179
  This possibility arises because of the possible existence of an 
unpublished opinion (or opinions), which would be unavailable to him, and 
because the unpublished nature of the disposition against him removed all 
incentive for en banc review of his case.
180
  Second, Browder argued that the 
Supreme Court‘s refusal to promulgate a uniform rule and the circuit court‘s 
wide variation on the precedential effect given to unpublished cases illustrated 
the need for a Supreme Court ruling that all cases are precedential.
181
  In 
support of this assertion, Browder cited to Supreme Court cases emphasizing 
the universality of precedent in all cases in the federal court.
182
  For example, 
in Hicks v. Miranda, the Court held that a decision on the merits, even one 
contained only in a summary dismissal or affirmance, is precedential and 
 
address it.). 
176. Id. 
177. Brief of Petitioner Ben Earl Browder at 7, Browder, 434 U.S. 257 (No. 76-5325), 1977 
WL 204850 [hereinafter Browder Petition].  This question was presented in the petition for certiorari 
as: 
 
May a United States Court of Appeals reverse a decision of a district court in an 
unpublished and non-citable opinion, when the case is not controlled by direct 
precedent, involves a substantial question pertaining to the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment, and where public notice of the decision might encourage 
Illinois to follow the lead of the American Law Institute and other states in 
enacting a statute to protect its citizenry from warrantless arrests for 
investigation? 
Brief for the Chicago Council of Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Browder, 434 
U.S. 257 (No. 76-5325), 1977 WL 189280 [hereinafter Browder Brief Amicus Curiae]. 
178. Browder Petition, supra note 177, at 50 (―This is the first case to reach the Court where 
the propriety of a circuit rule authorizing dispositions in unpublished orders which may not be cited 
as precedent in subsequent cases is squarely at issue.‖). 
179. Id. at 51. 
180. Id. at 51–52. 
181. Id. at 52–53. 
182. Id. at 53 (citing Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 
464 (1968)). 
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binding on the lower courts.
183
  Third, Browder argued that freeing appellate 
courts from the necessity of producing precedential decisions allows them ―‗to 
avoid making a difficult or troublesome decision or to conceal divisive or 
disturbing issues‘‖184—a prescient comment given the later remarks of federal 
appellate Judges Arnold and Wald.
185
  Fourth, Browder noted that the chair of 
the 1973 Committee upon which the unpublication system is based had, by 
the time of the promulgation of the circuit rules, reconsidered his position and 
stood against unpublication.
186
  Finally, Browder asserted that the act of 
issuing nonprecedential opinions exceeded the circuit courts‘ rulemaking 
authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (limiting the circuit courts‘ authority to 
regulating practices of their own courts) and that the power to promulgate 
rules with such a broad impact on all the federal courts and its litigants 
properly belonged to the Supreme Court alone under 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
187
 
In addition to Browder‘s arguments, the Chicago Council of Lawyers188 
filed an amicus curiae brief exclusively on the unpublication-nonprecedent 
issue presented by the Seventh Circuit Rule 35, which permitted designation 
of some decisions as unpublished.
189
  The amicus brief addressed both 
constitutional and nonconstitutional arguments against the unpublication 
system.  First, the amicus brief recited several nonconstitutional flaws in the 
unpublication system that call out for Supreme Court action, including: 1) that 
the system has an unequal impact on those who can search the courthouse 
records versus those who have no access to unpublished opinions; 2) that the 
authority of appellate courts to write single-use opinions reduces judicial rigor 
 
183. Hicks, 422 U.S. at 343–45. 
184. Browder Petition, supra note 177, at 54 (quoting NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers, 430 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1970)). 
185. See Arnold, supra note 69, at 223; Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the 
Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1995) (discussing her own 
observations as a judge on the D.C. Circuit). 
186. Browder Petition, supra note 177, at 55; see also PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE 
ON APPEAL 31–43 (1976) (referring to the recommendations of the 1973 Committee, ―If a non-
publication policy is to be adopted, those guidelines seem sound.  We do not, however, support such 
a policy,‖ and regarding the issue of precedent specifically, ―trying to impose a non -precedent status 
on decisions by declaring them non-citable is like attempting to throw away a boomerang.  The 
earlier decisions keep coming back because of lawyers‘ and judges‘ ingrained devotion to the force 
of stare decisis‖). 
187. Browder Petition, supra note 177, at 18–19, 56. 
188. Browder Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 177, at 1–2 (―The Chicago Council of Lawyers 
is an association of approximately 1,200 attorneys in Chicago.  The Council‘s princ ipal concern is 
the improvement of the administration of justice, both in the federal and the state courts. . . .  The 
Council‘s interest in this case relates to petitioner‘s challenge to Circuit Rule 35 of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, entitled ‗Plan for Publication of Opinions of the Seventh 
Circuit.‘  The Council is concerned that this Rule raises serious jurisprudential and constitutional 
questions, as amicus discusses infra.‖). 
189. Id. 
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and jeopardizes the rightness of individual outcomes; 3) that rules that bar 
litigants from relying on decisions do not also prohibit court use leading to 
unequal use of unpublished decisions; 4) that guidelines for choosing which 
cases to publish do not ensure the publication of all necessary cases; 5) that 
unpublished cases unfairly limit litigants‘ ability to seek review; and 6) that 
the system of selective publication creates an appearance of unfairness and 
impropriety.
190
  The amicus brief‘s constitutional argument relied primarily on 
the First Amendment, citing the inherent public nature of the courts, a right to 
know, the unpublication system‘s impermissible censorship of speech, and 
unconstitutional vagueness.
191
  The Chicago Lawyers‘ Council‘s Amicus 
Brief expressed a grave concern about the practice of selective publication 
and precedent.
192
  Yet the Respondent did not address the unpublication issue 
in its statement of questions presented or argument.
193
 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not address the issue in its ruling in 
Browder.
194
  Finding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because the time 
for appeal had expired before the motion was filed, the Court chose not to 
address any of Browder‘s other claims.195  Regarding the unpublished opinion 
issue, the Court stated only, ―[f]inally, petitioner questioned the validity of the 
Seventh Circuit‘s ‗unpublished opinion‘ rule. We leave these questions to 
another day.‖196 
B. Several Denials of Certiorari 
Since Browder, the Court has never granted certiorari on a case directly 
challenging the unpublished opinion practice.  It has chosen not to hear cases 
presenting the issue on several occasions. In at least thirty-six cases, the 
constitutionality or propriety of the unpublication system (and its denial of 
precedent) was directly challenged in the petition for certiorari.
197
  In seven 
 
190. Id. at 4–6. 
191. Id. at 45–55. 
192. Id. 
193. Brief of Respondent, Browder v. Dir., Dep‘t of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257 (1978) (No. 76-
5325), 1977 WL 189277. 
194. Browder, 434 U.S. at 258 n.1. 
195. Id. at 258. 
196. Id. at 258 & n.1. 
197. Untracht Petition, supra note 14; Spiegel Petition, supra note 14; Canatella Petition, supra 
note 14; Family Fare Petition, supra note 14; Wheeler Petition, supra note 14; Stilley Petition, supra 
note 14; Shefchuk Petition, supra note 14; N. Pacifica Petition, supra note 14; Heavrin Petition, 
supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition I, supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition II, supra note 14; Rana Petition, 
supra note 14; Seils Petition, supra note 14; Zimmerman Petition, supra note 14; Schmier III 
Petition, supra note 14; Rodriguez Petition, supra note 14; Carey Petition, supra note 14; Test Reply 
Brief, supra note 14; Martin Petition, supra note 14; Berrafato Petition, supra note 14; S. Clay Prods. 
Petition, supra note 14; Lewin Petition, supra note 14; Lemelson Med. Petition, supra note 14; Alcan 
Aluminum Petition, supra note 14; Wendt Petition, supra note 14; Mims Petition, supra note 14; 
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other petitions, the issue was discussed at some length in the petition without 
being part of the question presented for certiorari.
198
 
The first petition for certiorari directly challenging the use of unpublished 
opinions was in Do-Right Auto Sales v. United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit.
199
  In Do-Right Auto Sales, the petitioner sought a writ of 
mandamus, a rare and extraordinary remedy, overriding the circuit court‘s 
striking of an unpublished opinion from the petitioner‘s brief.200  The Supreme 
Court denied the petitioner‘s motion for leave to file a petition for writ of 
mandamus without comment.
201
  After Do-Right Auto Sales, petitioners 
continued to challenge the use of unpublished, allegedly nonprecedential, 
opinions.  During the period for which petitions are publicly available,
202
 
 
Pappas Petition, supra note 14; Segal Petition, supra note 14; Bostron Petition, supra note 14; Knight 
Petition, supra note 14; Smyly Petition, supra note 14; Schmier II Petition, supra note 14; Culp 
Petition, supra note 14; Litton Sys. Petition, supra note 14; Friedman Petition, supra note 14; Van 
Sant Petition, supra note 14; Gant, supra note 4, at 717 n.53 (―‗Whether Seventh Circuit Rule 28, 
which prohibits the publication of written ‗Orders‘ which set forth reasons for judgments, and further 
prohibits a litigant from citing as precedent and relying upon such orders, denies due process of law 
and violates First Amendment rights?‘‖ (quoting Motion for Leave to File Petition for Writs of 
Mandamus and Prohibition at 2, Do-Right Auto Sales v. U.S. Ct. of App. for 7th Cir., 429 U.S. 917 
(1976) (No. 85-1404))). 
198. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16–17, Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Fort 
Lauderdale, 127 S. Ct. 2910 (2007) (No. 06-1175), 2007 WL 608452 (stating that the ―attempt to 
sweep these four cases ‗under the rug‘ by issuing markedly similar unpublished decisions on a very 
contentious issue of law represents a misuse of unpublished decisions‖); Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 27–28, Cusano v. Klein, 549 U.S. 816 (2006) (No. 05-1492), 2006 WL 1440820 
(expressing concern about the unpublished nature of decision below as contrary to established law); 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, 7–8, 18 n.1, B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Rogers, 549 U.S. 824 (2006) 
(No. 05-1624), 2006 WL 1706947 (disputing claim that an ―unpublished‖ decision below does not 
cause conflict or justify certiorari); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21–23, Hatteberg v. Adair 
Enters., 534 U.S. 890 (2001) (No. 01-102), 2001 WL 34116502 (pro se petition refers in passing to 
Anastasoff and the unpublished opinion issue); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11–21, Youngblood 
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 531 U.S. 1152 (2001) (No. 00-1105), 2001 WL 34117089 (arguing that 
litigants have a right to know the  reasons for a decision, though not necessarily claiming that there is 
a right to publication or precedent); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15–21, Green v. City of Plano, 
531 U.S. 1112 (2001) (No. 00-643), 2000 WL 34000170 (claiming departure from precedent via 
unpublished opinion departs from accepted appellate methods without substantial analysis of the 
legal standard at issue); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27–29, Bennett v. Law Firm of Jones, 
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 519 U.S. 1108 (1997) (No. 96-678), 1996 WL 33439051 (arguing, 
briefly, for precedential status for circuit opinions, but only to seek correction of the specific 
unpublished case on appeal); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9–12, Stephenson v. Okla. Turnpike 
Auth., 503 U.S. 971 (1992) (No. 91-1296), 1992 WL 12074502 (pro se petition containing a bare 
allegation that the precedent-limiting rule of the Tenth Circuit exceeds its rulemaking authority 
without explaining the basis for that claim or the relevance to the underlying case). 
199. 429 U.S. 917 (1976) (denying a writ of mandamus filed following the Seventh Circuit‘s 
striking of citation to an unpublished opinion from party‘s brief); see also Wade, supra note 107, at 
713. 
200. Do-Right Auto Sales, 429 U.S. 917; see also Wade, supra note 107, at 713. 
201. Do-Right Auto Sales, 429 U.S. 917. 
202. Petitions for certiorari in cases where certiorari was denied are generally available from 
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thirty-five other cases have presented the unpublication issue when seeking 
certiorari.
203
  None were granted.
204
  Each of those thirty-five petitions 
challenged the constitutionality of the unpublication practice directly as a 
question presented for certiorari, though on a varying array of grounds and 
with varied depths of analyses.
205
  Nine of the thirty-five challenged state 
 
1995 forward, though some earlier petitions have been published. 
203. Untracht Petition, supra note 14; Spiegel Petition, supra note 14; Canatella Petition, supra 
note 14; Family Fare Petition, supra note 14; Wheeler Petition, supra note 14; Stilley Petition, supra 
note 14; Shefchuk Petition, supra note 14; N. Pacifica Petition, supra note 14; Heavrin Petition, 
supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition I, supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition II, supra note 14; Rana Petition, 
supra note 14; Seils Petition, supra note 14; Zimmerman Petition, supra note 14; Schmier III 
Petition, supra note 14; Rodriguez Petition, supra note 14; Carey Petition, supra note 14; Test Reply 
Brief, supra note 14; Martin Petition, supra note 14; Berrafato Petition, supra note 14; S. Clay Prods. 
Petition, supra note 14; Lewin Petition, supra note 14; Lemelson Med. Petition, supra note 14; Alcan 
Aluminum Petition, supra note 14; Wendt Petition, supra note 14; Mims Petition, supra note 14; 
Pappas Petition, supra note 14; Segal Petition, supra note 14; Bostron Petition, supra note 14; Knight 
Petition, supra note 14; Smyly Petition, supra note 14; Schmier II Petition, supra note 14; Culp 
Petition, supra note 14; Litton Sys. Petition, supra note 14; Friedman Petition, supra note 14; Van 
Sant Petition, supra note 14. 
204. Untracht v. Fikri, 128 S. Ct. 1666 (2008); Spiegel v. Volvo Cars N. Am., L.L.C., 128 S. 
Ct. 911 (2008); Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 128 S. Ct. 669 (2007); Family Fare, Inc. v. NLRB, 127 
S. Ct. 2991 (2007); Wheeler v. Mo. Dir. of Revenue, 549 U.S. 1266 (2007); Stilley v. Marschewski, 
549 U.S. 1112 (2007); Shefchuk v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 549 U.S. 952 (2006); N. Pacifica L.L.C. v. 
City of Pacifica, 546 U.S. 1138 (2006); Heavrin v. Schilling, 546 U.S. 1137 (2006); O.S.C. Co. v. 
Zymblosky, 546 U.S. 936 (2005); Rana v. United States, 546 U.S. 877 (2005); Seils v. Rochester 
City Sch. Dist., 544 U.S. 920 (2005); Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 543 U.S. 819 (2004); Schmier 
v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 543 U.S. 818 (2004); Rodriguez v. HFP, Inc., 541 U.S. 903 (2004); Carey v. 
Knox County, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004); Test v. Comm‘r, 538 U.S. 961 (2003); Martin v. KeyCorp, 538 
U.S. 961 (2003); Berrafato v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 537 U.S. 1233 (2003); 
S. Clay Prods., Inc. v. United Catalysts, Inc., 537 U.S. 1189 (2003); Lewin v. Cooke, 537 U.S. 881 
(2002); Lemelson Med. v. Symbol Techs., 537 U.S. 825 (2002); Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. 
Prudential Assurance Co., 536 U.S. 959 (2002); Wendt v. Mineta, 536 U.S. 941 (2002); Mims v. 
United States, 534 U.S. 1132 (2002); Pappas v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 534 U.S. 1129 (2002); Segal v. 
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 534 U.S. 1041 (2001); Bostron v. Massanari, 534 U.S. 896 (2001); Knight 
v. Maleng, 534 U.S. 820 (2001); Smyly v. IBM, 528 U.S. 982 (1999); Schmier v. Jennings, 522 U.S. 
1149 (1998); Culp v. Hood, 519 U.S. 1042 (1996); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Carroll, 516 U.S. 816 (1995); 
Friedman v. Montgomery County, 489 U.S. 1079 (1989); Van Sant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 475 U.S. 
1082 (1986), reh’g denied, 476 U.S. 1131 (1986). 
205. Untracht Petition, supra note 14; Spiegel Petition, supra note 14; Canatella Petition, supra 
note 14; Family Fare Petition, supra note 14; Wheeler Petition, supra note 14; Stilley Petition, supra 
note 14; Shefchuk Petition, supra note 14; N. Pacifica Petition, supra note 14; Heavrin Petition, 
supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition I, supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition II, supra note 14; Rana Petition, 
supra note 14; Seils Petition, supra note 14; Zimmerman Petition, supra note 14; Schmier III 
Petition, supra note 14; Rodriguez Petition, supra note 14; Carey Petition, supra note 14; Test Reply 
Brief, supra note 14; Martin Petition, supra note 14; Berrafato Petition, supra note 14; S. Clay Prods. 
Petition, supra note 14; Lewin Petition, supra note 14; Lemelson Med. Petition, supra note 14; Alcan 
Aluminum Petition, supra note 14; Wendt Petition, supra note 14; Mims Petition, supra note 14; 
Pappas Petition, supra note 14; Segal Petition, supra note 14; Bostron Petition, supra note 14; Knight 
Petition, supra note 14; Smyly Petition, supra note 14; Schmier II Petition, supra note 14; Culp 
Petition, supra note 14; Litton Sys. Petition, supra note 14; Friedman Petition, supra note 14; Van 
Sant Petition, supra note 14. 
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court unpublication practices,
206
 and twenty-six addressed the rules of the 
federal circuit courts of appeals.
207
  All but one of the petitions presented 
claims that the lower court‘s failure to publish its decision in that case 
violated constitutional protections,
208
 and the outlier was a case seeking 
declaratory judgment that California‘s limited publication/citation bar rule 
was unconstitutional based on alleged wrongs in other cases.
209
  The 
constitutional protection most asserted was due process (twenty-four cases),
210
 
followed by equal protection (thirteen cases).
211
  Only ten cases made a core 
 
206. Spiegel Petition, supra note 14; Wheeler Petition, supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition I, supra 
note 14; O.S.C. Petition II, supra note 14; N. Pacifica Petition, supra note 14; Schmier III Petition, 
supra note 14; Alcan Aluminum Petition, supra note 14; Schmier II, supra note 14; Culp Petition, 
supra note 14; Friedman Petition, supra note 14. 
207. Untracht Petition, supra note 14; Canatella Petition, supra note 14; Family Fare Petition, 
supra note 14; Stilley Petition, supra note 14; Shefchuk Petition, supra note 14; Heavrin Petition, 
supra note 14; Rana Petition, supra note 14; Seils Petition, supra note 14; Zimmerman Petition, 
supra note 14; Rodriguez Petition, supra note 14; Carey Petition, supra note 14; Test Reply Brief, 
supra note 14; Martin Petition, supra note 14; S. Clay Prods. Petition, supra note 14; Berrafato 
Petition, supra note 14; Lewin Petition, supra note 14; Lemelson Med. Petition, supra note 14; 
Wendt Petition, supra note 14; Mims Petition, supra note 14; Pappas Petition, supra note 14; Segal 
Petition, supra note 14; Bostron Petition, supra note 14; Knight Petition, supra note 14; Smyly 
Petition, supra note 14; Litton Sys. Petition, supra note 14; Van Sant Petition, supra note 14. 
208. Untracht Petition, supra note 14; Spiegel Petition, supra note 14; Canatella Petition, supra 
note 14; Family Fare Petition, supra note 14; Wheeler Petition, supra note 14; Stilley Petition, supra 
note 14; Shefchuk Petition, supra note 14; N. Pacifica Petition, supra note 14; Heavrin Petition, 
supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition I, supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition II, supra note 14; Rana Petition, 
supra note 14; Seils Petition, supra note 14; Zimmerman Petition, supra note 14; Rodriguez Petition, 
supra note 14; Carey Petition, supra note 14; Test Reply Brief, supra note 14; Martin Petition, supra 
note 14; Berrafato Petition, supra note 14; S. Clay Prods. Petition, supra note 14; Lewin Petition, 
supra note 14; Lemelson Med. Petition, supra note 14; Alcan Aluminum Petition, supra note 14; 
Wendt Petition, supra note 14; Mims Petition, supra note 14; Pappas Petition, supra note 14; Segal 
Petition, supra note 14; Bostron Petition, supra note 14; Knight Petition, supra note 14; Smyly 
Petition, supra note 14; Schmier II, supra note 14; Culp Petition, supra note 14; Litton Sys. Petition, 
supra note 14; Friedman Petition, supra note 14; Van Sant Petition, supra note 14. 
209. Schmier III Petition, supra note 14. 
210. Spiegel Petition, supra note 14; Family Fare Petition, supra note 14; Wheeler Petition, 
supra note 14; Stilley Petition, supra note 14; Shefchuk Petition, supra note 14; N. Pacifica Petition, 
supra note 14; Heavrin Petition, supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition I, supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition II, 
supra note 14; Rana Petition, supra note 14; Seils Petition, supra note 14; Zimmerman Petition, 
supra note 14; Schmier III Petition, supra note 14; Rodriguez Petition, supra note 14; Martin 
Petition, supra note 14; S. Clay Prods. Petition, supra note 14; Lewin Petition, supra note 14; 
Lemelson Med. Petition, supra note 14; Alcan Aluminum Petition, supra note 14; Segal Petition, 
supra note 14; Bostron Petition, supra note 14; Culp Petition, supra note 14; Litton Sys. Petition, 
supra note 14; Friedman Petition, supra note 14; Van Sant Petition, supra note 14. 
211. Untracht Petition, supra note 14; Family Fare Petition, supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition I, 
supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition II, supra note 14; Schmier III Petition, supra note 14; Rodriguez 
Petition, supra note 14; Carey Petition, supra note 14; S. Clay Prods. Petition, supra note 14; Alcan 
Aluminum Petition, supra note 14; Wendt Petition, supra note 14; Bostron Petition, supra note 14; 
Smyly Petition, supra note 14; Schmier II Petition, supra note 14; Culp Petition, supra note 14. 
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Article III claim,
212
 and only three of the thirty-five significant petitions relied 
on the First Amendment.
213
 
1. Cases Unlikely to Gain Certiorari on the Unpublication Issue 
The thirty-five petitions noted above vary widely in their approaches, and 
some seem particularly doomed for failure in bringing the unpublished 
opinion issue before the Court.  These petitions ranged from the accusatory 
and impassioned,
214
 to the vague,
215
 to relatively cursory (at least in regard to 
the unpublished opinion issue or the constitutional analyses).
216
  An example 
 
212. Canatella Petition, supra note 14; Family Fare Petition, supra note 14; Heavrin Petition, 
supra note 14; Schmier III Petition, supra note 14; Rodriguez Petition, supra note 14; Carey Petition, 
supra note 14; Berrafato Petition, supra note 14; Mims Petition, supra note 14; Pappas Petition, 
supra note 14; Knight Petition, supra note 14. 
213. Zimmerman Petition, supra note 14, at 24; Schmier III Petition, supra note 14, at 13 
(arguing that the restriction of citing unpublished opinions violates free speech); S. Clay Prods. 
Petition, supra note 14, at 18–19.  Under the present reality of published ―unpublished‖ opinions and 
free citation under FRAP 32.1, First Amendment arguments based on a right to know or speak would 
likely be irrelevant in the federal system.  However, the First Amendment ―right to access‖ argument  
advanced in Southern Clay Products, Inc. retains viability. 
214. Rodriguez Petition, supra note 14, at 7 n.6 (―Because the surreal nature of the unpublished 
decisions provided a prima facie case of political skullduggery, Rodriguez filed a Judicial Complaint 
under 28 U.S.C. § 372, CA4C No. 02-9008, against the various federal judges for acting outside of 
their jurisdiction.‖); Alcan Aluminum Petition, supra note 14, at 2, 5, 7 (―For example, in this case, 
the trial and appellate court actually construct an economic penalty against Alcan for exercising its 
right to appeal.  They do this because both courts share a mutual dislike for California state law 
which they are obliged to follow in this diversity action but refuse to do so.  They do not disclose 
their conduct, but attempt to bury it in the shadows of a NPO. . . .  The reality is that the inferior 
courts have used NPOs to disguise the fact that they have blatantly ignored explicit precedent of this 
Court.  They have used it to hide the fact that their holdings created clear disputes between the 
Circuits on pre-Victorian statements by this Court, and that they are again disregarding clear state 
law. . . .  Precedent can change, but it must do so rationally, visibly and PERMIT EVERYONE TO 
BENEFIT FROM THE CHANGE.‖); Culp Petition, supra note 14, at 29, 30, 35, 45 (containing 
accusations of ―repeated occurrences of judicial decisions being fixed,‖ a comparison to Watergate, a 
certain conclusion being called ―asinine,‖ and a conclusion of ―E tu [sic] Rehnquist?  Stevens?  
O‘Connor?  Scalia?  Kennedy?  Souter?  Thomas?  Ginsburg?  Breyer?‖). 
215. Shefchuk Petition, supra note 14, at 10 (never using the terms ―due process‖ or ―equal 
protection‖ nor their analytical requirements and discussing only ―rational system‖ and ―fairness‖); 
Wendt Petition, supra note 14, at 13 (a pro se petition mentioning the unpublished opinion debate for 
an inscrutable reason); Bostron Petition, supra note 14, at ii, 4–12 (raising the issue in the questions 
presented but completely ignoring it elsewhere in the petition). 
216. Untracht Petition, supra note 14, at 34–35 (pro se petition seeking review on the 
unpublished opinion issue by reciting concerns of both scholars and Supreme Court Justices, but only 
as a fallback preferable to summary dismissal, and using hyperbolic phrases like ―this Court bears the 
ultimate responsibility to defend the Constitution against such mockery and rape‖); Spiegel Petition, 
supra note 14, at 4 (mentioning unpublished opinions in the larger context of the possibility of an 
improper decision rendered by law clerks and without oral argument); Canatella Petition, supra note 
14, at 14–19 (the underlying matter does not even involve any unpublished cases, but the petitioner 
analogizes the lower court‘s alleged failure to follow precedent to the exceeding of judicial power 
referenced in Anastasoff); Stilley Petition, supra note 14, at 5–7 (claiming due process was violated 
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of one such case, which invoked the unpublished opinion system as a problem 
but then did not directly address it, was Van Sant v. United States Postal 
Service.
217
  In Van Sant, the petition challenged the unpublished decision of 
the Fourth Circuit below as the second of two issues on appeal.
218
  However, 
despite being one of only two issues on which certiorari was sought, the 
discussion of the issue was minimal.
219
  The issue accounted for just under 
five of the petition‘s forty-six pages and relied upon only one authority—a 
D.C. Circuit Advisory Committee on Procedures to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
report.
220
  The petition contained no analysis on any constitutional claim.  
Similarly, in Stilley v. Marschewski, the petition made only a bare claim that 
the lower court‘s disposition via unpublished opinion violates due process.221  
The petition did not set forth an analysis supporting its conclusion or cite to 
any authority on the constitutional issue.
222
  Moreover, even in the discussion 
of the unpublished circuit court decision, the primary complaint seems not to 
be the lack of publication but that the lower court did not address all the 
petitioner‘s points on appeal.223  Whatever these cases‘ prospects of gaining 
certiorari on other issues, they had little chance of bringing the unpublished 
opinion issue to the forefront of the Court‘s attention. 
 
by the circuit court‘s failure to address all his points on appeal); N. Pacifica Petition, supra note 14, 
at 27–28 (raising the fact that the lower court decision was unpublished as a pejorative without 
substantially arguing against such decisions); Heavrin Petition, supra note 14, at 25–30 (making a 
well-written, but brief, constitutional argument following an extensive and intricate bankruptcy law 
analysis); Rana Petition, supra note 14, at 5 & n.4 (seeking review under Sup. Ct. R. 10(a), which 
allows certiorari when a circuit court ―has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this 
Court‘s supervisory power‖ and mentioning due process only in passing); Carey Petition, supra note 
14, at 22 (mentioning the issue only briefly and relying upon Anastasoff as the only authority on the 
issue two years after that case‘s vacation); Martin Petition, supra note 14, at 7–17 (addressing the 
unpublished opinion precedent issue fairly directly, but only among additional arguments about law 
clerks, judicial ghostwriting, and publication rules and without analysis of the governing due process 
and equal protection standards); Segal Petition, supra note 14, at 18–20 (identifying the problem but 
including no constitutional analysis); Friedman Petition, supra note 14, at 31–36 (arguing that the 
state courts‘ nonpublication of litigants‘ prior cases was arbitrary and briefly mentioning due 
process); Van Sant Petition, supra note 14, at 43–46 (relying in this appeal from the Fourth Circuit 
on only a D.C. Circuit committee report). 
217. Van Sant Petition, supra note 14, at 15, 41–46. 
218. Id. at ii. 
219. Id. at 41–46. 
220. Id. at 43–44. 
221. Stilley Petition, supra note 14, at 5–7. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 7 (claiming due process was violated by the circuit court‘s failure to address all his 
points on appeal). 
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2. Promising Petitions for Certiorari on the Unpublication Issue 
Several of the thirty-five petitions seemed more promising but were 
ultimately unsuccessful.  Two such cases presented primarily the very narrow 
claim that the circuit courts‘ failures to publish their decisions below reduced 
the likelihood of direct review.
224
  These cases claimed that by not publishing 
the decisions below, the intermediate appellate courts reduced the petitioners‘ 
chances for review by the states‘ highest courts.225  Such a factually intensive 
claim, brought without significant factual support, against a state court system 
was understandably unappealing to the Court.
226
  Other cases presented the 
unpublished opinion issue directly but quite briefly or without fully 
elucidating the constitutional analyses.
227
  For example, the petition in 
Lemelson Medical v. Symbol Technologies noted that the Federal Circuit 
below, in an unpublished opinion, departed from prior published opinions of 
the circuit and then discussed the national debate in the wake of Anastasoff 
and the Supreme Court‘s recent concern with due process.228  But this 
argument is clearly secondary to the substantive argument that the circuit 
court erred on the merits.
229
 
Another relatively promising case, Schmier v. Supreme Court of 
California,
230
 technically involved two cases: an action for injunctive relief
231
 
and a declaratory judgment action based on alleged infringement of 
constitutional rights in the underlying action.
232
  Both essentially argued that 
California‘s unpublication scheme stifles protected First Amendment speech 
by barring citation and violates due process and equal protection guarantees of 
the Fourteenth Amendment by allowing for ―unbridled exercise of raw 
 
224. Wheeler Petition, supra note 14; Schmier II Petition, supra note 14. 
225. Wheeler Petition, supra note 14, at 13–16; Schmier II Petition, supra note 14, at 13–14. 
226. Cf. SUP. CT. R. 10 (noting that the Court does not take cases primarily for error correction 
or on issues of state law application). 
227. Seils Petition, supra note 14, at 2–21, 21–25 (containing over twenty pages of factual 
argument and less than four pages of fairly general due process allegations regarding unpublished 
opinions); Lemelson Med. Petition, supra note 14, at 26–28 (arguing briefly that the unpublished 
nature of the circuit court decision prevents review of the erroneous decision below); Mims Petition, 
supra note 14, at 12–15 (noting that circuit rules on unpublished opinions vary and referencing the 
recent Anastasoff opinion‘s Article III argument with minimal analysis); Knight Petition, supra note 
14, at 14–18 (relying upon Anastasoff with little additional analysis); Smyly Petition, supra note 14, 
at 8–10 (pro se petition raising the issue of unfairness and extra-judicial acts). 
228. Lemelson Med. Petition, supra note 14, at 26–28. 
229. Id. (including a three-page discussion of the issue at the end of a thirty-page petition that 
extensively details the underlying claim). 
230. 543 U.S. 818 (2004). 
231. Schmier v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 531 U.S. 958 (2000); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Schmier, 
531 U.S. 958 (No. 00-302), 2000 WL 33999285 [hereinafter Schmier I Petition]. 
232. Schmier, 543 U.S. 818; Schmier III Petition, supra note 14. 
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governmental power.‖233  Schmier I, the 2000 petition, argued that 
nonpublication rules allow courts to create a system of ―selective 
prospectivity‖; that is, the courts impermissibly violate an individual‘s due 
process or equal protection rights by treating the individual differently than 
other similarly situated litigants.
234
  The petition also argued that prohibitions 
on citation to court opinions represented unlawful prior restraint on free 
speech.
235
 Schmier II was an appeal regarding attorneys‘ fees sought after 
Schmier I, which gave rise to further complaints about California‘s 
unpublication rules.
236
  Schmier III, the 2004 petition, addressed alleged 
violations in both Schmier I and II.
237
  The petition for certiorari in Schmier III 
echoed the arguments from Schmier I in part but argued the First Amendment 
point almost exclusively.
238
  Both cases were dismissed by the lower courts 
for either lack of standing or lack of merit on the constitutional issue.
239
  The 
Supreme Court denied certiorari, for reasons known only to the Court itself, 
though several factors may have militated against certiorari.  First, the 
underlying nature of the case was a challenge to state court rules brought by 
petitioner on his own behalf (and behalf of all those similarly situated).
240
  
Second, Schmier I at least was denied below based on lack of standing, a 
determination under state law.
241
  Finally, while written with great passion, 
neither petition fully set forth the constitutional arguments mentioned in the 
Questions Presented section of the brief nor hewed closely to the extant 
Supreme Court tests for such claims. 
3. Particularly Thorough or Compelling Petitions 
Finally, five of these thirty-five significant petitions presented particularly 
clear, thorough, and well-pled challenges to the nonpublication of opinions.  
First, though relying only on the core Article III argument, Pappas v. UNUM 
 
233. Schmier I Petition, supra note 231, at 8; see also Schmier III Petition, supra note 14, at 
13. 
234. Schmier I Petition, supra note 231, at 10–15. 
235. Id. at 16–18. 
236. Schmier III Petition, supra note 14, at 6. 
237. Id. at 5–6. 
238. Schmier III Petition, supra note 14. 
239. See Schmier v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 583–84, 585–86 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2000) (holding Schmier lacked standing and that the court‘s standards for publication prevent 
―selective prospectivity‖); Schmier v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., No. A101206, 2003 WL 22954266 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Dec. 16, 2003) (unpublished/noncitable) (holding Schmier‘s First Amendment argument 
without merit). 
240. Schmier III Petition, supra note 14, at 7. 
241. Schmier‘s claim was not that the lack of standing was incorrect but that California‘s 
nonpublication and noncitation rule violated rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.  Id. at 11–14.  
Still, the case involved a challenge to state law administrative rules and a state law determination that 
the case did not belong before the court.  Id. 
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Life Insurance Co. of America made both the usual claim of wrongly applied 
precedent via unpublished opinion and detailed the judicial and scholarly 
concern with the practice of denying the precedent of unpublished opinions 
and the wide range of circuit rules on the issue.
242
  The petition made clear 
that this is a fundamental issue of national concern—usually a plus in gaining 
certiorari, though it was unsuccessful here.
243
 
Second, in Lewin v. Cooke, the appellant Lewin presented a very 
straightforward claim that the issuance of unpublished opinions violated due 
process.
244
  Lewin argued that allowing circuit courts to issue unpublished 
opinions: (1) allows circuits to contradict the Supreme Court or themselves; 
(2) effectively denies the litigant of further review given the small percentage 
of en banc motions and petitions for certiorari granted; and (3) lessens the 
public‘s confidence in, and regard for, the federal judiciary.245  Lewin did not 
argue for the publication of all opinions but only the narrower subset of cases, 
which he called the ―disobedient‖ opinions—those opinions in which the 
circuit deviated from settled Supreme Court or circuit law.
246
  Lewin proposed 
that the aggrieved party serve as the arbiter of which opinions fit into that 
subset and that upon decision of that party the opinion would be published.
247
  
Lewin argued that the losing party should have the right to insist upon 
publication in the name of due process to facilitate further review: 
 
Publication upon an appellant‘s request seems like a modest 
and minimal safe guard, doing no harm if the appellant‘s fears 
are misguided.  If the inclusion of a few extra pages in a 
Federal Reporter can help to guarantee the integrity of the 
appellate process and sustain public confidence in that 
process against the suspicion of possible abuse, then the 
minimal cost should be well worth it.  By asserting such a 
deterrent due process right, parties should be able to reinforce 
the sovereignty of this Court when that sovereignty is 
undermined by disobedience cloaked in abuses of 
nonpublication.
248
 
 
 
242. Pappas Petition, supra note 14. 
243. Id. at 10–11 (―Not only is the escalating practice of issuing non-precedential opinions of 
concern to the bench and to legal scholars, it also is a matter of fundamental importance to litigants 
such as petitioner.‖).  A similar argument was made in Berrafato Petition, supra note 14, at 24–30. 
244. Lewin Petition, supra note 14, at 6–18.  A similar due process argument was raised in 
Litton Systems, Inc. v. Carroll.  Litton Sys. Petition, supra note 14, at 14–21. 
245. Lewin Petition, supra note 14, at 6–18. 
246. Id. at 14. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. at 17–18. 
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It is difficult to see how this narrower remedy could work, though; few 
losing litigants, aside from repeat litigants seeking to avoid a ―bad‖ precedent, 
would prefer an unpublished opinion to a published one.  Moreover, the 
litigant has no basis for determining what ―disobedient‖ means; presumably, 
the vast majority of litigants believe the court to be disobedient to the 
controlling law whenever the court rules against them.  Discerning the reason 
for denial, which coincidentally may be merely a function of volume, is 
difficult at best.  Perhaps the problem is that while Lewin presents the due 
process challenge to the unpublication system directly, it does not do so in the 
analytical terms commonly used by the Court.  So, though the challenge is 
clear and direct, it is not in the language of a due process challenge and 
proposes a solution that is probably untenable. 
Third, in O.S.C. Co. v. Zymblosky, O.S.C. Co. challenged the lower 
courts‘ decisions to invalidate its deeds without a jury trial, claiming that the 
lower courts acted in an unpublished opinion contrary to clear published 
authority.
249
  The crux of that equal protection claim was that the 
Pennsylvania courts‘ internal operating procedure permitting unpublished 
opinions allowed the courts below to treat O.S.C.‘s claim differently than 
similarly situated parties.
250
  While it is well-established that an incorrect 
decision by a court is not a constitutional violation,
251
 O.S.C. claimed that the 
problem extended beyond mere misapplication of the law to a procedure that 
permitted, without recourse, the abandonment of governing precedent.
252
  The 
respondent, Zymblosky, argued that O.S.C.‘s complaint was: (1) in error on 
the substantive law; (2) a complaint about mere misapplication of the law; and 
(3) contrary to a recent Pennsylvania Superior Court decision approving the 
internal operating procedure in question.
253
  While it is impossible to know 
what persuaded the Supreme Court to deny certiorari, it seems likely that the 
fact that it was a state court internal operating procedure, combined with the 
fact that the Pennsylvania courts had recently found the practice acceptable 
under the Pennsylvania Constitution,
254
 may have deterred the Supreme Court 
from granting certiorari. 
Fourth, in Southern Clay Products, Inc. v. United Catalysts, Inc., the 
Court was presented with an interesting challenge to the Federal Circuit‘s 
combination of precedent-denying and en banc restricting rules.
255
  Southern 
 
249. O.S.C. Petition II, supra note 14, at 7–10. 
250. Id. 
251. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 554–55 (1962). 
252. O.S.C. Petition II, supra note 14, at 12–17. 
253. Brief in Opposition at 7–10, O.S.C. Co. v. Zymblosky, 546 U.S. 936 (2005) (No. 05-156), 
2005 WL 2104235. 
254. Schaaf v. Kaufman, 850 A.2d 655, 658–59 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). 
255. S. Clay Prods. Petition, supra note 14. 
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Clay Products, Inc. had its eighty million dollar trial verdict overturned by the 
Federal Circuit over the vigorous dissent of the Chief Judge.
256
  Southern Clay 
then petitioned the Supreme Court for review armed with several factors in its 
favor.  First, the case was a challenge to federal court rules based on federal 
constitutional law.
257
  Second, the Federal Circuit had rules explicitly denying 
unpublished opinions precedential value
258
 and virtually required a 
precedential opinion to gain en banc review,
259
 which effectively shielded the 
Federal Circuit‘s panel decisions from further review.260  Third, Southern 
Clay‘s petition was brought following both a favorable jury determination and 
the Federal Circuit Chief Judge‘s dissent to vacation of that jury verdict.261  
Southern Clay‘s petition presented a well-organized and somewhat detailed 
argument claiming that the whipsaw of Federal Circuit rules violates the First 
Amendment right of access to the courts
262
 and the Fifth Amendment rights of 
due process and equal protection.
263
  The petition included significant 
authority demonstrating that Southern Clay‘s access to the courts, and the 
manner in which the rules regarding unpublished opinions, violate those 
rights.
264
  It also argued that by deciding its case by unpublished opinion, in 
contravention of the circuit‘s established precedent, the Federal Circuit 
effectively removed Southern Clay‘s due process right to rely upon precedent 
and created a class of one in contravention of equal protection.
265
  This 
petition seemed to present a strong case for certiorari under Supreme Court 
Rule 10(a), its only immediately apparent weakness being its intra-circuit, 
rather than inter-circuit, nature; yet, it was denied. 
Finally, the most clear, direct, and complete challenge to the federal 
courts‘ practice of issuing unpublished opinions was made in the recent case 
of Family Fare, Inc. v. NLRB.
266
  In this case, the petitioner, Family Fare, Inc., 
claimed that the Sixth Circuit‘s unpublished decision in the case overruled 
 
256. S. Clay Prods., Inc. v. United Catalysts, Inc., 43 Fed. Appx. 379 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also 
S. Clay Prods. Petition, supra note 14, at 9–12. 
257. S. Clay Prods. Petition, supra note 14, at 14–25. 
258. FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b) (2001), superseded by FED. CIR. R. 32.1 (2006). 
259. FED. CIR. R. 35(b)(2). 
260. S. Clay Prods. Petition, supra note 14, at 5. 
261. S. Clay Prods, Inc., 43 Fed. Appx. at 389 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting) (―The issue of 
infringement was fully presented to the jury who returned a verdict of willful infringement against 
United.  United‘s only defenses were invalidity or unenforceability and because it cannot prove the 
elements of those defenses, I respectfully dissent.‖). 
262. S. Clay Prods. Petition, supra note 14, at 18. 
263. Id. at 19–22. 
264. Id. at 18–19. 
265. Id. at 19–22; Reply to Brief in Opposition at 5–7, S. Clay Prods, Inc. v. United Catalysts, 
Inc., 537 U.S. 1189 (2003) (No. 02-848), 2003 WL 21698023. 
266. Family Fare Petition, supra note 14. 
2009] ENDING THE UNPUBLICATION SYSTEM 725 
and conflicted with its prior published decisions, thus violating Family Fare‘s 
due process and equal protection rights and exceeding the court‘s judicial 
power under Article III of the United States Constitution.
267
  The underlying 
case involved Family Fare‘s challenge to the ―validity of a union election 
based on objectionable conduct by statutory supervisors under the National 
Labor Relations Act (―NLRA‖).‖268  Family Fare explained that the Sixth 
Circuit‘s published standard held that ―‗[t]he party challenging the election 
need not introduce proof of actual coercion,‘‖269 and the Sixth Circuit panel‘s 
unpublished opinion in this case held, ―[s]ome showing of coercion is 
required to sustain a finding of objectionable conduct.‖270  Under Sixth Circuit 
Rule 206(c): ―Reported panel opinions are binding on subsequent panels.  
Thus, no subsequent panel overrules a published opinion of a previous panel.  
Court en banc consideration is required to overrule a published opinion of the 
court.‖271  Thus, what the Sixth Circuit panel in Family Fare did was one of 
two things, both of which violated Family Fare‘s constitutional rights.  Either 
the panel departed from the published legal standard in a way that did not alter 
the published law of the circuit, effectively treating Family Fare differently 
than all other similarly situated parties before and after this decision, or it 
altered published law of the circuit contrary to rule 206(c).
272
  Family Fare 
seemed concerned that it was the former and that ―[t]he Sixth Circuit has 
subjected the election here to a legal standard different than the one that 
applies in every other comparable union election case in the Sixth Circuit‖;273 
whereas, the NLRB seemed to view the case as the latter, an alteration of the 
governing law, as evidenced by its motion to the Sixth Circuit to publish the 
case as one that ―‗sets a framework for addressing an issue of considerable 
importance to the labor bar and provides much-needed guidance on a new 
approach to what previously [has] been an area of dispute between the Board 
and the Sixth Circuit.‘‖274  Either the Sixth Circuit treated Family Fare 
differently, violating its equal protection rights, or it departed from its 
precedent without reason or justification and without following its own 
process for departing from a panel decision, thereby failing to afford Family 
Fare due process. 
 
267. Id. at i. 
268. Id. at 3. 
269. Id. at 4 (quoting Harborside Healthcare, Inc. v. NLRB, 230 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2000); 
Evergreen Healthcare, Inc. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d 867, 874 (6th Cir. 1997)). 
270. Id. 
271. 6TH CIR. R. 206(c). 
272. Family Fare seemed concerned with the former—that it was being treated differently than 
every other comparable employer. 
273. Family Fare Petition, supra note 14, at 6. 
274. Id. at 6–7 (emphasis omitted) (quoting NLRB‘s motion for publication). 
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The petition set forth clear and cogent arguments for the 
unconstitutionality of the unpublication practice as applied to Family Fare‘s 
case.
275
  It organized both its equal protection and due process arguments 
according to the relevant constitutional tests and made reasonable claims that 
those tests were met.
276
  Additionally, the petition for certiorari challenged the 
circuit court‘s constitutional authority to issue unpublished, nonprecedential 
opinions.
277
  Its argument on this point relied on the analysis in Anastasoff and 
noted the weight of scholarly and judicial authority siding with that 
analysis.
278
  The petition‘s own analysis on this point was minimal, relying 
largely on the readers‘ understanding of the debate referenced in the cited 
authorities.  In addition to its well-organized and argued constitutional claims, 
this petition very clearly set forth a justification for granting certiorari: 
―Review by this Court is required to protect the parties‘ constitutional rights 
and to provide guidance to all Circuit Courts of Appeal that face the problem 
of panel decisions that circumvent binding published authority in conflict with 
their own rules.‖279  This case seemed a good one for review; it challenged the 
federal rules and practice, involved wholly federal case law, set forth 
thorough claims of constitutional violations tracking the relevant tests ably, 
and rhetorically made a persuasive case for the need for review.  Moreover, 
both parties appeared to have agreed on the underlying nature of the 
unpublished case, that is, that the unpublished case deviated from prior 
published circuit authority. 
This deviation from published authority, as well as the possibility that 
unpublished decisions may be evading review, had been mentioned before in 
the dissents to several denials of certiorari.
280
  One such dissent read: 
 
The fact that the Court of Appeals‘ opinion is unpublished is 
irrelevant.  Nonpublication must not be a convenient means to 
prevent review.  An unpublished opinion may have a 
 
275. Id. at 14–27. 
276. Id. 
277. Id. at 27–29. 
278. Id. 
279. Id. at 5. 
280. Langston v. United States, 506 U.S. 930, 930 (1992) (White & Thomas, JJ., dissenting); 
Costa v. United States, 506 U.S. 929, 929 (1992) (White & O‘Connor, JJ., dissenting); Waller v. 
United States, 504 U.S. 962, 962–65 (1992) (White & O‘Connor, JJ., dissenting); Smith v. United 
States, 502 U.S. 1017, 1017–20 (1991) (Blackmun, O‘Connor & Souter, JJ., dissenting); St. Louis 
S.W. Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry., 484 U.S. 907, 907 (1987) (White & Brennan, JJ., dissenting); 
Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 965–72 (1983) (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., 
dissenting); Hyman v. Rickman, 446 U.S. 989, 989–92 (1980) (Blackmun, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., 
dissenting) (all dissenting opinions finding circuit split based on at least one unpublished opinion).  
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lingering effect in the Circuit and surely is as important to the 
parties concerned as is a published opinion.
281
 
 
Yet, the Court in 2007 was unwilling to take up the issue in Family Fare, 
Inc.  Still, other comments from the Court over the years demonstrate that the 
practice of unpublished opinions does not sit well with the Court,
282
 that the 
Court recognizes the potential for abuse,
283
 and even that the Court does not 
fully accept the assertion that they are nonprecedential.
284
 
C. Supreme Court Comments in Other Cases 
While the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the 
constitutionality or propriety of the unpublication system, it has mentioned the 
practice, often with great skepticism, in the course of deciding cases on other 
issues.  These cases can be grouped into three categories.  First, there are a 
number of cases in which the Court cited to or mentioned unpublished 
opinions.  For example, there are a half-dozen cases in which the Court cited 
to the Federal Appendix specifically
285
 and numerous cases in which the 
Court referred to an unpublished decision below.
286
 
Second, and more probative, are a number of cases in which the Court 
granted certiorari because an unpublished decision was in conflict with a 
published decision.
287
  For example, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 
 
281. Smith, 502 U.S. at 1020 n.* (mem.) (Blackmun, O‘Connor & Souter, JJ., dissenting).  
282. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 425 n.3 (1993) (―We deem it remarkable 
and unusual that although the Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment that an Act of Congress was 
unconstitutional as applied, the court found it appropriate to announce its judgment in an unpublished 
per curiam opinion.‖). 
283. County of L.A. v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936, 937–40 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―As this 
Court‘s summary disposition today demonstrates, the Court of Appeals would have been well 
advised to discuss the record in greater depth. . . .  That decision not to publish the opinion or permit 
it to be cited—like the decision to promulgate a rule spawning a body of secret law—was plainly 
wrong.‖). 
284. Comm‘r v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987) (―The Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction 
regardless of nonpublication and regardless of any assumed lack of precedential effect of a ruling that 
is unpublished.‖). 
285. Sole v. Wyner, 1274 S. Ct. 2188, 2194 (2007); Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 151, 152, 
153 (2007); Domino‘s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 474 (2006); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 
668, 687 (2004); Cruz-Osornio v. United States, 540 U.S. 1131, 1131 (2004); Pacheco-Zepeda v. 
United States, 532 U.S. 966, 966 (2001). 
286. E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 61 (2000); Johnson v. 
United States, 529 U.S. 694, 699 n.3 (2000); Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 436 (1997); Old Chief 
v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 177 (1997); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 106 (1995); Harris 
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 
452–53 (1993); Terrell v. Morris, 493 U.S. 1, 3 (1989); Comm’r, 484 U.S. at 7. 
287. E. Associated Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 61; Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 177–78; Lynce, 519 U.S. 
at 436; Thompson, 516 U.S. at 106; Harris, 510 U.S. at 20; Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 453–54 
(―The [unpublished] decision below, and the Lessig line of decisions on which it relies, conflicts with 
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involving an abusive work environment claim, the Court granted certiorari to 
resolve the conflict between the Sixth Circuit‘s unpublished decision 
(requiring a showing of serious effect on a claimant‘s psychological well-
being) and the Ninth‘s Circuit‘s contrary rule.288  The Court‘s taking of these 
cases suggests that it views unpublished opinions as precedential and capable 
of causing conflict in the law.  The Supreme Court does not take cases for the 
purpose of correcting errors in a single case but to resolve inter-circuit conflict 
or important national issues.
289
  If, as most circuit court rules suggest,
290
 
unpublished decisions are without precedential value, then there would be no 
chance of affecting the state of the law and no need to correct the error in a 
single case.  Instead, the Court has granted certiorari to resolve the conflicts 
caused by these unpublished decisions. 
Third, there is a single case in which the Court‘s majority opinion directly 
mentioned the issue of unpublished opinions.
291
  In Commissioner v. McCoy, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the court of appeals exceeded its jurisdictional 
authority and noted that it would not accept the premise that the unpublished 
circuit court decision was unreviewable or nonprecedential: 
 
We note in passing that the fact that the Court of Appeals‘ 
order under challenge here is unpublished carries no weight in 
our decision to review the case.  The Court of Appeals 
exceeded its jurisdiction regardless of nonpublication and 
regardless of any assumed lack of precedential effect of a 
ruling that is unpublished.
292
 
 
Beyond this single direct reference, there is little in the Court‘s 
jurisprudence dealing with unpublished opinions as an issue.
293
  However, 
 
holdings of courts in other Circuits. . . .  We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict among the 
Circuits.  We reverse.‖ (citation omitted)). 
288. Harris, 510 U.S. at 20. 
289. SUP. CT. R. 10. 
290. See Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie Wallace Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules 
Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions: An Update, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 349, 351–
57 (2004) (citing 1ST CIR. R. 36(b); 2D CIR. R. 0.23; 3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.2; 4TH CIR. R. 36(a); 6TH CIR. R. 
206(a); 7TH CIR. R. 53(b), (c)(1); 8TH CIR. R. APP. I(4); 9TH CIR. R. 36-1, 36-2; 10TH CIR. R. 36.1, 
36.2; 11TH CIR. R. 36-1, 36-2; FED. CIR. R. 47.6(a)). 
291. Comm’r, 484 U.S. at 7.  The other direct statement about the system itself came in a 
dissent from Justice Stevens to a summary reversal of a Ninth Circuit unpublished decision.  See 
County of L.A. v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936, 937–41 (1985) (criticizing the Supreme Court‘s growing 
practice of summary reversals, stating: ―For, like a court of appeals that issues an opinion that may 
not be printed or cited, this Court then engages in decision-making without the discipline and 
accountability that the preparation of opinions requires‖). 
292. Comm’r, 484 U.S. at 7. 
293. Though an examination of the Court‘s view of stare decisis, precedent, and original intent 
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specific Justices‘ statements in separately authored opinions, scholarly 
writings, and public comments may provide further evidence about how the 
sitting Court may view the issue and will be addressed in Part V. 
V. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES‘ DISPOSITIONS TOWARD THE UNPUBLICATION 
PRACTICE 
While far less probative of the Court‘s perspective than its prior opinions, 
the Justices‘ statements in separately authored opinions, scholarly writings, 
and public comments may provide some indication about how the sitting 
Court may view the issue of unpublication and whether it might take up the 
issue in an upcoming term.  Each sitting Justice‘s writings of these types have 
been examined to find any comment on the unpublication system. 
A. Justice Stevens: Outspoken Critic of the Unpublication System 
The most direct and persistent critic of the unpublication system on the 
high Court is Justice John Stevens.  In 1976, Justice Stevens spoke to the 
Illinois State Bar Association regarding the issue, condemning the practice in 
its earliest days: 
 
A rule which authorizes any court to censor the future citation 
of its own opinions or orders rests on a false premise.  Such a 
rule assumes that an author is a reliable judge of the quality 
and importance of his own work product.  If I need authority 
to demonstrate the invalidity of that assumption, I refer you to 
a citizen of Illinois who gave a brief talk in Gettysburg, 
Pennsylvania that he did not expect to be long remembered.  
Judges are the last persons who should be authorized to 
determine which of their decisions should be long 
remembered.
294
 
 
This statement, made in Justice Stevens‘s first year on the Court, 
expresses a fundamental disagreement with the premise of the unpublication 
system.  He does not appear to have waivered from this position, as evidenced 
by his recent comments: 
 
Q: Is the decision to grant or deny cert. influenced by whether 
the opinion from the court below is a published or 
nonpublished opinion? 
 
on these issues may provide some insights, such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this Article, 
which focuses on direct commentary on the unpublished opinion issue. 
294. Justice John Paul Stevens, Remarks at the Illinois State Bar Association‘s Centennial 
Dinner (Jan. 22, 1977), quoted in Browder Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 177, at 37. 
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A [Justice Stevens]: Well, I tend to vote to grant more on 
unpublished opinions, on the theory that occasionally judges 
will use the unpublished opinion as a device to reach a 
decision that might be a little hard to justify.
295
 
 
Though stated diplomatically, Justice Stevens‘s concern is a serious one 
and finds support in a number of recent studies
296
 and circuit judges‘ 
writings.
297
  Similarly, in a dissent to a denial of certiorari, Justice Stevens 
gently chided the Fifth Circuit for issuing directly contradictory published and 
unpublished opinions and noted that while the lack of an inter-circuit conflict 
made denial of certiorari technically proper, it worked an injustice on the 
petitioner.
298
  Justice Stevens expressed dismay that the petitioner‘s 
unpublished case condemned him to eighteen months in prison whereas the 
similarly situated defendant in United States v. Lopez, a case decided two days 
after the petitioner‘s, was sentenced to less.299  While acknowledging the 
propriety of denial of certiorari, Justice Stevens lamented the system itself: 
 
That, however, is the kind of burden that the individual 
litigant must occasionally bear when efficient management is 
permitted to displace the careful administration of justice in 
 
295. Jeffrey Cole & Elaine E. Bucklo, A Life Well Lived: An Interview with Justice John Paul 
Stevens, 32 LITIG. 8, 67 (2006). 
296. Brian P. Brooks, Publishing Unpublished Opinions: A Review of the Federal Appendix, 5 
GREEN BAG 259, 260–63 (2d ed. 2002); David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, 
Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 820 (2005) (―[V]oting 
and publication are, for some judges, strategically intertwined: for example, judges may be prepared 
to acquiesce in decisions that run contrary to their own preferences, and to vote with the majority, as 
long as the decision remains unpublished, but can be driven to dissent if the majority insists upon 
publication.‖); Robert A. Mead, “Unpublished” Opinions as the Bulk of the Iceberg: Publication 
Patterns in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals, 93 LAW LIBR. J. 
589, 602–03 (2001) (studying publication rates by subject matter in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits 
over a six-month period and finding great disparity in publication rates, especially in areas where the 
government is a litigant); Merritt & Brudney, supra note 107, at 120 (finding unpublished decisions 
are substantive and contain ―a noticeable number of reversals, dissents, or concurrences,‖ and 
―significant associations between case outcome and judicial characteristics‖); Wald, supra note 185, 
at 1374 (noting a six-month study of D.C. Circuit cases found forty percent of unpublished cases 
arguably met the publication standards and noting she believed that percentage to be much higher in 
1995); Pamela Foa, Comment, A Snake in the Path of the Law: The Seventh Circuit’s Non-
Publication Rule, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 309, 315–40 (1977) (citing a six-month study of Seventh 
Circuit cases that revealed fifteen percent of unpublished cases were substantively significant and 
met the publication standards). 
297. See Arnold, supra note 69, at 223 (discussing his concern with strategic decision-making 
encouraged by the unpublished opinion system); Wald, supra note 185, at 1374 (discussing her 
observations of misuse of unpublished opinions as a judge on the D.C. Circuit). 
298. Taylor v. United States, 493 U.S. 906, 906 (1989). 
299. Id. 
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each case.  Perhaps it is not too late for the Court of Appeals 
to exercise additional care in the administration of justice in 
this case.
300
 
 
Justice Stevens expressed another concern in his dissent to withdrawal of 
certiorari in Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp.,
301
 
a case which challenged the practice of vacating judgments at the behest of 
the parties who have come to a separate settlement.  In Justice Stevens‘s view, 
the Court ought to have decided the case and rejected the practice.
302
  He 
noted that making decisions disappear, even at the will of the parties, was 
contrary to American law: ―Judicial precedents are presumptively correct and 
valuable to the legal community as a whole.  They are not merely the property 
of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the public 
interest would be served by a vacatur.‖303  While not dealing with unpublished 
opinions specifically, the comment demonstrates a viewpoint regarding the 
nature of precedent and litigants‘ right to rely upon what the courts have 
previously done. 
This same concern is apparent in Justice Stevens‘s dissent in County of 
Los Angeles v. Kling.
304
  In Kling, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
summarily reversed, but Justice Stevens dissented, comparing the majority‘s 
failure to examine the case to the troubling practice of issuing unpublished 
opinions: ―For, like a court of appeals that issues an opinion that may not be 
printed or cited, this Court then engages in decisionmaking without the 
discipline and accountability that the preparation of opinions requires.‖305  To 
support this view, Justice Stevens quoted Karl Llewellyn: 
 
―In our law the opinion has in addition a central forward-
looking function which reaches far beyond the cause in hand: 
the opinion has as one if not its major office to show how like 
cases are properly to be decided in the future.  This also 
frequently casts its shadow before, and affects the deciding of 
the cause in hand.  (If I cannot give a reason I should be 
willing to stand to, I must shrink from the very result which 
 
300. Id.  But see Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 165 (1984) (stating 
that a lower court‘s interlocutory and summary reversal was in an ―unpublished opinion with no 
precedential significance‖). 
301. 510 U.S. 27, 34–41 (1993) (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). 
302. Id. 
303. Id. at 40. 
304. 474 U.S. 936, 937–40 (1985). 
305. Id. at 940. 
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otherwise seems good.)  Thus the opinion serves as a 
steadying factor which aids reckonability.‖306 
 
A similar comment, chiding a lower court and expressing concern with both 
the Court‘s summary decisions and the lower courts‘ unpublished opinions, 
can be found in Board of Education of Rogers, Arkansas v. McCluskey: 
 
In ever-increasing numbers, appeals throughout the federal 
system are being decided in this anonymous fashion.  It is not 
uncommon for courts of appeals to issue opinions that are not 
to be cited as authority in other cases.  In one recent published 
case—which was sufficiently important to induce this Court 
to grant certiorari even before a conflict in the circuits had 
developed—the court purported to justify such an ad hoc 
adjudication by asserting that it lacked ―precedential 
character.‖  The threat to the quality of our work that is 
presented by the ever-increasing impersonalization and 
bureaucratization of the federal judicial system is far more 
serious than is generally recognized.  Regrettably the example 
set by this Court in cases of this kind is not one of resistance, 
but rather of encouragement, to the rising administrative 
tide.
307
 
 
Another, more telling, sign can be seen in Justice Stevens‘s signing on to 
a concurring opinion, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, which describes the 
Framers‘ understanding of common law judicial decisionmaking in precisely 
the same manner as that of Judge Arnold and other critics of the unpublication 
system.
308
 As noted in Part III, critics of the unpublication system view the 
Framers‘ perception of ―judicial power‖ granted by Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution as inherently precedent-based.  Judge Arnold‘s Anastasoff 
decision reviewed the fundamental sources of law known to the Framers, such 
as Coke, Blackstone, and Hale, as well as the Framers‘ (both the Federalists‘ 
and the Anti-Federalists‘) own comments.309  Anastasoff held that Article III 
prohibited the issuance of nonprecedential opinions and described our 
nation‘s judicial foundations this way: 
 
306. Id. at 940 n.6 (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 26 (1960)). 
307. Bd. of Educ. v. McCluskey, 458 U.S. 966, 972 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting with 
Brennan & Marshall, JJ.) (internal citations omitted) (reproaching the Second Circuit over its recent 
use of an unpublished decision in Rowley v. Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School 
District, 632 F.2d 945, 948 n.7 (2d Cir. 1980), rev’d, 458 U.S. 176 (1982)). 
308. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 467–81 (2001) (Scalia, Stevens & Thomas, JJ., 
dissenting). 
309. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 900–04 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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Inherent in every judicial decision is a declaration and 
interpretation of a general principle or rule of law.  This 
declaration of law is authoritative to the extent necessary for 
the decision, and must be applied in subsequent cases to 
similarly situated parties.  These principles, which form the 
doctrine of precedent, were well established and well 
regarded at the time this nation was founded.  The Framers of 
the Constitution considered these principles to derive from 
the nature of judicial power, and intended that they would 
limit the judicial power delegated to the courts by Article III 
of the Constitution.
310
 
 
The opinion in Rogers v. Tennessee, signed onto by Justice Stevens, contains 
a consonant view of history and the centrality of precedent.
311
  For example, 
the opinion explains: 
 
The near-dispositive strength Blackstone accorded stare 
decisis was not some mere personal predilection.  Chancellor 
Kent was of the same view: ―If a decision has been made 
upon solemn argument and mature deliberation, the 
presumption is in favor of its correctness; and the community 
have [sic] a right to regard it as a just declaration or 
exposition of the law, and to regulate their actions and 
contracts by it.‖  See also Hamilton‘s statement in The 
Federalist: ―To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is 
indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules 
and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty 
in every particular case that comes before them.‖312 
 
Justice Stevens has a long-standing and abiding concern with the propriety of 
nonprecedential precedents, the ill-justified unfairness that they invite, and the 
departure from our nation‘s historical legal foundations they represent. 
B. Justices Scalia and Thomas: Historical Consonance Regarding Precedent 
Justice Antonin Scalia seems to hold a similar view of history, though he 
has commented less on the unpublication dilemma than Justice Stevens.  For 
example, while it is not specifically about unpublished opinions, Justice 
 
310. Id. at 899–900 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177–78 (1803); James B. Beam 
Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 290 (1821)) 
(other citations omitted). 
311. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 472–81. 
312. Id. at 473 n.2 (internal citations omitted). 
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Scalia‘s dissent in Rogers v. Tennessee, discussed above, not only reflects the 
originalist constitutional exegesis that he is known for,
313
 but also parallels the 
view of the Framers‘ notions of precedent that underpin Judge Arnold‘s 
Anastasoff opinion.
314
  Justice Scalia is a self-avowed textualist, one who is 
concerned with the text of the document being interpreted, and originalist, one 
who is concerned with the meaning given to a text by its authors.
315
  As he 
describes it, ―[t]he theory of originalism treats a constitution like a statute, 
giving the constitution the meaning that its words were understood to bear at 
the time they were promulgated.‖316  This form of constitutional interpretation 
is fundamental to the argument that nonprecedential opinions exceed the 
Framers‘ (and therefore Article III‘s) meaning of ―judicial power.‖317  Justice 
Scalia has similarly said, ―[The Constitution] means today not what current 
society (much less the Court) thinks it ought to mean, but what it meant when 
it was adopted,‖ and ―I look at a text.  I take my best shot at getting the fairest 
meaning of that text, and where it is a constitutional text, understanding what 
it meant at the time it was adopted.‖318 
Justice Scalia has not spoken directly to the unpublication system, but he 
has clearly expressed an interpretation of the concept of ―judicial power‖ that 
the argument against nonprecedential opinions rests upon: 
 
If the division of federal powers central to the constitutional 
scheme is to succeed in its objective, it seems to me that the 
 
313. See generally Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 
(1989). 
314. Compare Rogers, 532 U.S. at 473 n.2, with Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899–900. 
315. See Justice Antonin Scalia, A Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, Speech at Catholic 
University of America (Oct. 18, 1996) [hereinafter Scalia Theory of Constitutional Interpretation] 
(transcript available at http://www.proconservative.net/PCVol5Is225ScaliaTheoryConstl 
Interpretation.shtml) (―I belong to a school, a small but hardy school, called ‗textualists‘ or 
‗originalists.‘  That school used to be ‗constitutional orthodoxy‘ in the United States.‖); see also 
Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 14, 2005) (transcript available at 
http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/freedomline/current/guest_commentary/scalia-constitutional-speech.htm) 
(―I am one of a small number of judges, small number of anybody—judges, professors, lawyers—
who are known as originalists.  Our manner of interpreting the Constitution is to begin with the text, 
and to give that text the meaning that it bore when it was adopted by the people.  I‘m not a ‗strict 
constructionist,‘ despite the introduction.  I don‘t like the term ‗strict construction.‘  I do not think the 
Constitution, or any text should be interpreted either strictly or sloppily; it should be interpreted 
reasonably.  Many of my interpretations do not deserve the description ‗strict.‘  I do believe, 
however, that you give the text the meaning it had when it was adopted.‖). 
316. See Scalia Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 315. 
317. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899–904. 
318. See Justice Antonin Scalia, Call for Reckoning: God‘s Justice and Ours, Panel Discussion 
Before the Pew Center Conference (Jan. 25, 2002) (transcript available at 
http://pewforum.org/deathpenalty/resources/transcript3.php). 
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fundamental nature of those powers must be preserved as that 
nature was understood when the Constitution was enacted.  
The Executive, for example, in addition to ―[tak]ing Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed,‖ Art. II, § 3, has no power to 
bind private conduct in areas not specifically committed to 
his control by Constitution or statute; such a perception of 
―[t]he Executive power‖ may be familiar to other legal 
systems, but is alien to our own.  So also, I think, ―[t]he 
judicial Power of the United States‖ conferred upon this 
Court and such inferior courts as Congress may establish, Art. 
III, § 1, must be deemed to be the judicial power as 
understood by our common-law tradition.
319
 
 
As the advocates of full precedential value for all cases make a similarly 
originalist, due process argument, Justice Scalia may be amenable to an 
appeal on that ground as well.
320
 
Justice Thomas, also an avowed originalist, would seem to approach the 
issue of judicial power in a similar manner,
321
 but because he has said nothing 
on this issue directly, little can be said about Justice Thomas‘s views on the 
unpublication system without engaging in presumptuous speculation. 
C. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito: Citation Advocates 
Unlike Justices Scalia and Thomas, who have rarely, if ever, addressed the 
unpublication system directly, the Court‘s two newest Justices, Chief Justice 
John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, were both significantly involved with 
returning citability to all federal decisions.  Both Chief Justice Roberts and 
Associate Justice Alito served on the Judicial Conference Advisory 
Committee on Appellate Rules during the recent drafting and approval of 
FRAP 32.1 on citation of unpublished opinions.
322
  Both were advocates of a 
 
319. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, Marshall & 
Blackmun, JJ., concurring) (alterations in original). 
320. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 435–36 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(―The Court‘s opinion establishes that the right of review eliminated by the amendment was a 
procedure traditionally accorded at common law.  The deprivation of property without observing (or 
providing a reasonable substitute for) an important traditional procedure for enforcing state-
prescribed limits upon such deprivation violates the Due Process Clause.‖). 
321. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian 
Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1130 (2008) (describing ―self-proclaimed originalist 
Justices Scalia and Thomas‖); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of 
Constitutional Common Law, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y 519, 527 (2008) (describing ―self-
professed ‗originalists‘ like Justices Thomas and Scalia‖). 
322. Justice Alito served on the Committee from 1997 to 2005, serving as its chairman from 
2001 to 2005. See Samuel Alito, Responses to Senate Confirmation Questionnaire, available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/Alito_Questionnaire.pdf.  Chief Justice Roberts, then a judge on the 
D.C. Circuit, was said to be the next in line to chair the committee and a person with a ―personal 
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uniform citation rule.
323
  Justice Alito, for example, has said of the noncitation 
system in the federal courts: ―Such a system cannot be justified.‖324  Though 
he has expressed concern about how change would be achieved,
325
 he has 
stated that change is needed: ―I do not think that we should—or that we will 
be able to—retain precisely the system we now have.‖326  He further 
explained, ―[p]rohibiting or limiting citation of unpublished opinions at times 
deprives the court of valuable information. . . .  More important, allowing 
citation of unpublished opinions sends an important message about the nature 
of a court‘s unpublished opinions. . . .  By allowing citation, a court 
recognizes the legitimacy of all of its opinions.‖327 Justice Alito was a strong 
proponent of the rule regarding citation.
328
 
Justice Alito has also expressed a belief that the issue of precedent would 
be best addressed by the Court.  In 2002, Justice Alito testified before the 
House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property (of the 
Committee on the Judiciary): 
 
[T]he question of precedential value, of course, implicates the 
doctrine of stare decisis, which has traditionally been 
developed by the courts in the course of deciding cases.  This 
is an area in which there have been some very interesting 
developments in recent years.  There has been a renewal of 
academic interest in the area, there have been some very 
interesting and provocative judicial decisions in the area, and 
I think it is the overwhelming sentiment of the judiciary that 
this development should continue in this manner in the 
 
interest‖ in the unpublished opinion issue.  See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. 
Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary , 
109th Cong. 341 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation Hearing] (in response to a question by 
Senator Kohl, ―Well, I am familiar with how the Judicial Conference operates for at least part of its 
role.  I‘ve been on the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules.  I was there as a lawyer and I kept 
on as a judge.  In fact, I was slated to be the Chairman of that Committee starting in October.‖); Tony 
Mauro, Judicial Conference Supports Citing Unpublished Opinions, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005, 
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1127207112718. 
323. Schiltz, supra note 18, at 1475 (―[A]ll of the appellate judges on the Advisory Committee 
(including Judges Alito and Roberts) have supported Rule 32.1.‖). 
324. Alito Symposium Address, supra note 78, at SAA-01719. 
325. Id. at SAA-01715 (noting that while abandoning the published/unpublished distinction 
would be ―the preferred option of a great many practitioners and academics,‖ it would be unworkable 
without some other systemic change). 
326. Id. at SAA-01717. 
327. Id. at SAA-01719–20. 
328. Id. at SAA-01718 (―The other feature of current practice that I believe must be altered 
concerns the issue addressed by proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, the issue 
whether lawyers should be allowed to cite ‗unpublished‘ opinions in their briefs.‖). 
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common law tradition and should not be regulated by the 
national rules process.
329
 
 
It is apparent that Justice Alito favored lifting the citation ban and believed 
the issue of precedent was a rule for the Court rather than the rule-making 
body. 
In terms of a historical view of the nature of precedent, Justice Alito 
relies, as did Justice Roberts in his own confirmation process, on Federalist 
No. 78, by Alexander Hamilton: 
 
In all the areas that you mentioned, there is now a 
considerable body of case law, and that is a real limitation on 
the exercise of judicial power.  That is one of the important 
reasons for the doctrine of stare decisis.  In the 78th 
Federalist Paper, when Alexander Hamilton was responding 
to the people who were worried about this power of judicial 
review, who thought that it would give the judiciary too much 
power, he specifically cited the fact that members of the 
judiciary would be bound up by precedent and this would 
restrain them.  This would keep them from injecting their 
own views into the decisionmaking process.
330
 
 
While Justice Alito holds a view of history consonant with Judge Arnold‘s 
Anastasoff opinion and Justice Scalia‘s concurring opinion in James B. Beam 
Distilling Co. v. Georgia,
331
 it is less clear what opinion he holds regarding 
the constitutional issues surrounding nonprecedential opinions.
332
  Certainly, 
he would regard the views of the Framers as a starting point for constitutional 
interpretation,
333
 but no more specific statements by Justice Alito exist. 
 
329. Unpublished Judicial Opinions, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, 
and Intellectual Property, 107th Cong. 6 (2002) [hereinafter Alito Unpublished Judicial Opinions]. 
330. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 526 (2006) [hereinafter Alito Confirmation Hearing]. 
331. 501 U.S. 529, 548–49 (1991) (Scalia, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring). 
332. Justice Alito recounted a conversation with Judge Richard Arnold on the issue but 
expressed only the pragmatic concerns rather than any opinion on the jurisprudential question.  Alito 
Symposium Address, supra note 78, at SAA-01708–09.  Likewise, in advocating for full citation, he 
carefully explained that such a citation rule did not mandate that precedential status similar to cases 
in the Federal Reporter needed to be granted to unpublished opinions.  Id. at SAA-01710–14. 
333. Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 330, at 465 (in response to questioning by Senator 
Brownback, ―In interpreting the Constitution, I think we should proceed in the way we proceed in 
interpreting other important legal authorities.  In interpreting statutes, for example, I think we should 
look to the text of the Constitution and we should look to the meaning that someone would have 
taken from the text of the Constitution at the time of its adoption.‖). 
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Chief Justice Roberts has similarly stated his approval of the new citation 
rule and been more circumspect on the precedent issue.  Chief Justice Roberts 
has been quoted on the citation issue as saying, ―[a] lawyer ought to be able to 
tell a court what it has done,‖ in support of FRAP 32.1.334  In the April 2004 
Advisory Committee Meeting, he expressed concern that there was a tension 
between the noncitation advocates‘ arguments and the practical and historical 
issues of precedent: 
 
Traditionally I think in our adversary system we allow 
disputes about the value of citable materials to be resolved by 
the lawyers in the exercise of their professional judgment in 
the interest of their client and let the judges decide whether 
we think that‘s worth anything, whether it‘s an opinion from 
another circuit, a district court opinion, a student comment in 
a law review. . . .  However basic the proposition, in my 
professional judgment this is what I want that court to know 
on my client‘s behalf and I found it frustrating to have a rule 
saying you can‘t do that.335 
 
Justice Roberts, in his confirmation process, affirmed a belief in the 
historical underpinnings of the pro-precedent argument.  For example, in 
responding to questions about the nature of precedent put to him by then-
Senator Biden, Justice Roberts responded: ―As Alexander Hamilton explained 
in Federalist No. 78: ‗To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is 
indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, 
which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that 
comes before them.‘‖336  He likewise noted that the intent of the Framers was 
an important starting place for constitutional analysis.
337
  But he rejected 
being categorized as an originalist,
338
 strict constructionist,
339
 or any other 
label,
340
 and neither his confirmation hearings nor prior scholarship or court 
opinions touch at all on the unpublished opinion issue. 
 
334. See Mauro, supra note 322. 
335. Transcript, Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 52–54 (Apr. 13, 
2004), available at http://www.nonpublication.com/aphearing.htm (also using the term ―noncitable 
precedent‖ to refer to unpublished opinions). 
336. Letter from Judge John Roberts to Sen. Arlen Spector, Senate Judiciary Committee (Sept. 
21, 2005), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/senate/judiciary/sh109-158/549-555.pdf 
(responses to written questions from then Senator Biden). 
337. See Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 322, at 182 (in response to questioning by 
Senator Grassley, ―I do think it‘s the—that the Framers‘ intent is the guiding principle that should 
apply‖). 
338. See id. at 158. 
339. See id. 
340. See id. (When asked directly by Senator Hatch: ―Some of the philosophies [Cass 
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Whether these views by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito translate 
to a view that the Constitution compels precedential value of all opinions is 
unknown.  Part of the difficulty in assessing the predisposition of Justices 
Roberts and Alito on the issue of precedent is that, as Advisory Committee 
members, they were concerned with the citation rule before them and not the 
precedent issue.  In educating others and moving toward a uniform citation 
rule, the committee was scrupulous in separating the issues of publication, 
citation, and precedent.
341
  In their positions as circuit judges, they were not in 
a position to address the practice, and they have not yet had opportunity on 
the Supreme Court to do so. 
D. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer: Scholarly and Structural Concerns 
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer have both addressed the issue of volume in 
the federal courts in their scholarship while serving on the circuit courts.  
While Justice Breyer‘s work barely touches on the issue of unpublished 
opinions, Justice Ginsburg addresses the issue at some length, finding it to be 
―a problematic device.‖342 
Justice Ginsburg has made no comment in the form of judicial opinions on 
the unpublication system, but her scholarship reveals considerable thought on 
the practice.  First, in 1983 Justice Ginsburg, then a judge on the D.C. Circuit, 
wrote a thoughtful law review article on the establishment of the federal 
judiciary under Article III of the Constitution.
343
  In that piece she examined, 
inter alia, the issue of caseload volume and workload in the federal courts.
344
  
Regarding unpublished opinions, she recognized their usefulness, 
―unpublished memoranda are time savers generally reserved for cases 
presenting neither a novel issue nor a question of evident significance to 
 
Sunstein‘s recent book] discussed were whether a judge should be an originalist, a strict 
constructionist, a fundamentalist, a perfectionist, a majoritarian or a minimalist.  Which of those 
categories do you fit in?‖  Judge Roberts replied: ―Like most people, I resist the labels. I have told 
people when pressed that I prefer to be known as a modest judge, and to me that means some of the 
things that you talked about in those other labels.  It means an appreciation that the role of the judge 
is limited, that a judge is to decide the cases before them, they‘re not to legislate, they‘re not to 
execute the laws.  Another part of that humility has to do with respect for precedent that forms part of 
the rule of law that the judge is obligated to apply under principles of stare decisis.‖). 
341. See Alito Unpublished Judicial Opinions, supra note 329, at 5 (―The issue of these 
unpublished or ‗non-precedential‘ opinions, as some of us now call them, seems to raise three major 
questions.  They are related, but I think it is worth trying to keep them separate.‖); Advisory 
Committee, supra note 96, at 11 (―[T]his Committee has gone out of its way to avoid expressing a 
view on Anastasoff.‖). 
342. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload of 
Federal Judges, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 10 (1983) (internal citations omitted). 
343. See generally id. 
344. Id. at 7–13. 
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persons other than the parties,‖345 but also their downside, ―[e]ven so, the 
unpublished decision is a problematic device, for the signed opinion has a 
checking function; as former Chief Judge of the First Circuit Frank Coffin 
said, a fully articulated written opinion ‗represent[s] some guarantee against 
loose thinking, sloppy workmanship, and arbitrariness.‘‖346  In addition, she 
noted that the practice of issuing decisions without opinions is not desirable to 
litigants: ―My court has a local rule promising an expedited decision if the 
parties stipulate to disposition without opinion.  I know of no case in which 
litigants have invoked the rule.‖347 
Similarly, in 1985, Justice Ginsburg discussed her experiences and 
thoughts about the federal appellate judiciary in a law review article entitled 
The Obligation to Reason Why.
348
  In that piece, Justice Ginsburg discussed 
the keenly felt obligation of the federal appellate judiciary to arrive at correct 
and fair conclusions as well as her insider‘s look at how decisions are arrived 
at and communicated to the public.
349
  She again noted the utility of 
unpublished memoranda as a tool to deal with the rising tide of cases but 
expressed serious concern with their use: ―[t]he unsettling question, to which I 
will return, is whether cases resolved by abbreviated disposition are in fact 
decided with sufficient care and hard thought.‖350  In addition, she noted: ―A 
study of the use of unpublished abbreviated dispositions, sponsored by the 
Federal Judicial Center, indicates the need for further attention to this question 
by the Judicial Conference of the United States.‖351  Justice Ginsburg 
addressed directly the question of ―[h]ow do these dispositions, our practice of 
not publishing them, and our rule against citation of unpublished orders as 
precedent, measure up against the court‘s obligation to reason why?‖352  She 
approved of abbreviated dispositions
353
 but not dispositions that omit any 
 
345. Id. at 9. 
346. Id. at 10. 
347. Id. 
348. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Obligation to Reason Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 205 (1985). 
349. Id. 
350. Id. at 213–14. 
351. Id. at 214 n.41 (citing William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of 
Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 
573, 631 (1981)). 
352. Id. at 218. 
353. This is perhaps one of the best suggestions for resolving the undeniably high volume of 
federal appeals.  Somewhere between a full, dissertational opinion and a summary disposition lies an 
abbreviated opinion that is signed by specific judges and gives: (1) the holding relevant to the case; 
(2) a statement of the prior authority that governs; and (3) a brief statement of the reasoning or facts 
that clearly bring this case within the ambit of the prior authority.  This shortened opinion need not 
set forth the history of the rule, its prior applications, the full chain of reasoning, or other information 
that would be included when the court is consciously expanding or retracting the scope of the rule (or 
changing the governing rule).  If, indeed, cases disposed of by abbreviated opinions are the easy 
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reasoning entirely: ―I believe a court of appeals should never release a result 
without any stated reason.‖354  The reasoning she would require ―need not be 
elaborate,‖ and a simple statement of agreement with the reasoning below or 
citation to the circuit or Supreme Court authority would suffice.
355
  Regarding 
limited publication rules specifically, she again expressed concern, stating 
―[a] limited publication rule, however sensible its purpose, is susceptible of 
misuse.‖356  The abuse she had in mind was that a judge or panel might ―resort 
to an unpublished, abbreviated disposition to conceal or avoid a troublesome 
issue.‖357  Her proposed solution to this would be a system that defaults to 
publication as well as greater reproduction, indexing, and citation of 
unpublished opinions by third parties.
358
  In this regard, Justice Ginsburg‘s 
preferred model has come to pass; ―unpublished‖ appeals court decisions are 
now both widely published and citable.  Though it cuts against the grain of 
her overall concerns with the use of unpublished opinions, she twice in that 
article suggested that when a court labels something as ―lacking general 
precedential value,‖ it ought to respect that by not citing to such cases itself.359  
She did not say whether decisions so labeled can actually be stripped of their 
precedential value or whether simply, having labeled them as of lesser value, 
the court ought to respect that.  She did call for ―a sensible, even-handed, 
uniform system for all of the circuits.‖360  While we now have such a rule 
regarding citation, there is still no rule regarding the form and nature of 
dispositions nor the precedential value of those opinions. 
Finally, in 1990, when writing on the issue of authoring separate opinions, 
Justice Ginsburg again noted that publication of opinions provides judicial 
accountability and requires judges to test their own thoughts before making 
them law.
361
  Though the discussion of unpublished opinions is not central to 
her essay, she emphasized the accountability point: 
 
I betray no confidence when I tell you that unsigned work 
products, more often than signed opinions, are fully 
composed by hands other than a judge‘s own—by staff 
attorneys or law clerks—and let out with scant editing by the 
 
cases, such a statement ought to be feasible.  Cf. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 186, at 33–35. 
354. Ginsburg, supra note 348, at 221. 
355. Id. at 222. 
356. Id. 
357. Id. 
358. Id. at 222–23. 
359. Id. at 223. 
360. Id. 
361. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 139 
(1990). 
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supervising panel.  Judges generally do not labor over 
unpublished judgments and memoranda, or even published 
per curiam opinions, with the same intensity they devote to 
signed opinions.  As a bright commentator observed in a 
related context: ―When anonymity of pronouncement is 
combined with security in office, it is all too easy for the 
politically insulated officials to lapse into arrogant ipse 
dixits.‖362 
 
Justice Ginsburg‘s writings evince serious concerns about the issuance of 
unpublished opinions, particularly in the high percentage of cases left 
unpublished.  But her concern is more about accountability, thoughtfulness, 
and communication by the federal appellate judiciary than about the problem 
of nonprecedential precedents or the alleged constitutional infirmities of the 
unpublication system.  Still, her clear concerns with the system seem to bode 
well for those seeking certiorari on the issue of unpublished opinions. 
Justice Breyer has not addressed the issue of unpublished opinions but has 
discussed the underlying problem of volume in the federal courts.  The 
volume explosion that gave rise to the unpublication system was also a 
driving force behind a reevaluation of the circuit system generally.  Various 
potential remedies for dealing with growing case loads were examined, 
including splitting some of the larger, busier circuits; adding another tier of 
appellate review in the federal system; creating a single unified appellate 
system; and removing certain classes of cases from general federal (or federal 
appellate) jurisdiction.
363
  Justice Breyer, then Chief Judge of the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals, delivered a lecture on court administration in 1990.
364
  In it, 
Justice Breyer seemed generally satisfied with the process of tracking cases, 
but not into the published/unpublished bins the unpublication system requires.  
Instead, he viewed as less important only the cases that were likely to settle, 
fail on procedural grounds, be obviated by intervening factual or legal 
development, or involve only simple factual questions.
365
  He also expressed 
concern with any greater tracking of cases or relegation of any additional 
cases to the lesser track;
366
 unfortunately, that is exactly what has happened in 
the years since 1990.
367
  And, while Justice Breyer identified the abundance of 
 
362. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
363. See generally FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 88. 
364. Stephen Breyer, Administering Justice in the First Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29 
(1990). 
365. Id. at 32–33. 
366. Id. at 43. 
367. JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 11, at 52 tbl.S-3 (showing the percent unpublished in the 
twelve-month period ending September 30, 2006, to be 84.1%). 
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precedents as a problem, as opposed to a lack of precedents that unpublication 
opponents would complain of, his predicted solution was not to bar or 
suppress some precedents but to create an intermediate tier of appellate courts 
to speak with a more unified legal voice.
368
  In this regard, Justice Breyer did 
not advocate such a structural change, but predicted it: ―I am not advocating a 
major structural change at present. . . .  Yet, . . . this approach presents a 
possible long-range solution to a significantly increased caseload and, unless 
the caseload stops growing, this is what will happen eventually.‖369 
Justice Breyer‘s thoughtful discussion prefers some means to address the 
volume issue over others, specifically greater case management, promotion of 
alternative dispute resolution, and efficient case management, but he 
ultimately concluded that ―a circuit court of appeals can do very little on its 
own.‖370  Whether the recognition of the need for both local and global 
solutions to the volume problem translates into a willingness to hear and strike 
down the present unpublication system seems uncertain.  This focus on 
administration and pragmatism suggests an unwillingness to strike down the 
present system without an adequate replacement, but perhaps now that he is 
Justice Breyer, he would be willing to issue a constitutional interpretation 
without regard to the administrative concern that was his focus as Chief Judge 
of the First Circuit.  This single comment by Justice Breyer seems too little to 
support much reasoned prediction about his opinion on the unpublication 
system. 
E. Justices Kennedy and Souter: Silent on the Issue 
Finally, Justices Anthony Kennedy and David Souter seem to have 
remained almost entirely silent on the issue of unpublished opinions.  Not a 
single comment has been found in any separate concurrence or dissent nor any 
piece of scholarship or even any media comment. 
The only public comment tying Justice Kennedy to the issue of the recent 
citation discussion is a hearsay comment recounted by noncitation opponent 
Michael Schmier: ―‗When Justice Anthony Kennedy was here for a speech, 
my brother and I went up to him to talk about this and he got very angry at 
us,‘ Mr. Schmier said, quoting the former Californian as replying, ‗If you 
guys want us to do it right, we‘d need 1,000 more judges.‘‖371  Given the 
 
368. Breyer, supra note 364, at 40–42. 
369. Id. at 42. 
370. Id. at 48. 
371. Frank J. Murray, Justices to Review Access to Opinions, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2000, at 
A8, available at http://famguardian.org/Subjects/LawAndGovt/LegalEthics/Nonpublication/Press/ 
MURRAY.htm (quoting Michael Schmier, advocate of lifting nonpublication rules, specifically in 
California, and petitioner in Schmier v. Supreme Court of California, 531 U.S. 958 (2000) (denying 
certiorari), which despite the title of the article was not reviewed—the high Court denied certiorari). 
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second-hand nature of this comment as well as the lack of context as to the 
system being discussed little can be inferred about Justice Kennedy‘s opinion 
on the issue of precedent of unpublished opinions. 
Regarding Justice Souter, there is even less.  He did sign on to a dissent to 
denial of certiorari authored by Justice Blackmun, also signed by Justice 
O‘Connor, stating: ―The fact that the Court of Appeals‘ opinion is 
unpublished is irrelevant.  Nonpublication must not be a convenient means to 
prevent review.  An unpublished opinion may have a lingering effect in the 
Circuit and surely is as important to the parties concerned as is a published 
opinion.‖372  Of course, Justice Souter has elected to step down from the Court 
following the 2008-2009 Term.
373
  His recently nominated, and likely to be 
appointed, replacement, Judge Sonia Sotomayor, has an equally unknown 
opinion on the issue of unpublished opinions and precedent.
374
  Nothing in her 
writings or public comments reveal an opinion on this issue.  If the next 
Supreme Court Justice is other than Sonia Sotomayor, his or her views on 
unpublished opinions may be as inscrutable as those of Souter and Sotomayor 
or as well-established as those of Justice Stevens.  Only time will tell what 
predisposition, if any, our new ninth Justice will have on this issue. 
In sum, the separate statements by the sitting Supreme Court Justices 
illustrate a varying degree of interest in the issue and concern with the system.  
Justice Stevens is plainly and steadfastly disapproving of the entire 
unpublication system.  Justice Ginsburg shares those grave concerns, though 
her writings paint her as less concerned with the precedent aspect of the 
debate.  Justice Scalia and probably Justice Thomas support the originalist 
interpretation of our Framers‘ views on precedent inherent in Article III.  
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have both been outspoken advocates 
of the pro-citation rule, FRAP 32.1, and have expressed general concerns 
about the unpublication system.  Justices Breyer, Souter, and Kennedy have 
made only passing references, if any, to the issue.  While none of this evinces 
a clear willingness to rule, as Judge Richard Arnold did in Anastasoff, that 
circuit nonpublication rules violate the Constitution, or that such rules violate 
equal protection or due process, they at least suggest a willingness on the part 
of a majority of the Court to examine the issue. 
 
372. Smith v. United States, 502 U.S. 1017, 1020 n.* (1991) (mem.) (Blackmun, O‘Connor & 
Souter, JJ., dissenting). 
373. Letter from Supreme Court Justice David H. Souter to President Barack H. Obama (May 
1, 2009), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/press/DHSLetter.pdf; see also Nina 
Totenberg, Supreme Court Justice Souter to Retire, NAT‘L PUBLIC RADIO, Apr. 30, 2009, available 
at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103694193. 
374. Ben Feller, Historic Nomination: Hispanic Sotomayor as Justice, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
May 27, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/26/ 
AR2009052600881.html. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The tripartite unpublication system has fallen apart.  Cases were 
unpublished to save time and costs and then declared noncitable to deny the 
market for them and, finally, they were declared nonprecedential by relying 
on ―the correspondence of publication and precedential value on the one hand, 
and of non-publication and non-precedent value on the other hand.‖375  This 
―morass of jurisprudence‖—a justification for denying precedent to cases for 
the first time in common law history—was never examined by the 1973 
Committee nor by any authority promulgating the precedent-denying rules.  
Despite numerous petitions for certiorari, the Supreme Court has never 
reviewed the issue.  Any petition for certiorari faces an uphill battle given the 
numerous petitions and few grants of certiorari.  Still, several Justices have 
expressed concern with the unpublication system and support for the historical 
and constitutional arguments opponents of that system rely upon.  While 
certiorari, and ultimately a constitutional ruling, are improbable, such claims 
ought to be pursued.
376
  The only remaining piece of the unpublication 
system—denial of precedent—is unjustified and improper.  Whatever 
adjustment the federal judiciary must make in the wake of such a decision, 
principle demands an end to the practice.  The time has come to drain the 
morass of jurisprudence avoided by past policymakers and set a better 
foundation for the future of the American federal common law system. 
 
375. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 1, at 21. 
376. In the Court‘s only grant of certiorari on a case raising this issue, Browder, it left open the 
question for another day.  Browder v. Dir., Dept. of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 258 n.1 (1978) 
(―Finally, petitioner questioned the validity of the Seventh Circuit‘s ‗unpublished opinion‘ rule.  We 
leave these questions to another day.‖).  Hopefully, that day is not too far off.  
